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ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
Fatma E. Marouf† 
The United States places over 440,000 people each year in immigration 
detention, far more than any other country in the world. This Article argues that 
there are compelling humanitarian and financial reasons to utilize more alternatives 
to detention. It examines the strengths and limitations of existing alternatives, 
including the need to develop more community-based case management programs 
and to rely less on electronic monitoring. The Article then sets forth several legal 
arguments under the Constitution, Rehabilitation Act, and international human 
rights law for requiring greater consideration of alternatives to detention. 
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Immigration detention has become one of the most egregious 
forms of mass incarceration in the United States. Over 440,000 
immigrants are detained in this country each year, far more than 
anywhere else in the world.1 The number of immigration detainees is 
now over twice the total number of federal inmates serving sentences for 
all federal crimes combined.2 On any given day, 37,000 noncitizens are 
held in immigration detention centers across the country, of whom 
25,000 do not yet have a final order of removal.3 Nearly three-quarters 
of these detainees are held in facilities run by private prison 
 
 1 JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 5 tbl.5 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. The number of detainees has nearly 
doubled since 2005; cf. MARY DOUGHERTY, DENISE WILSON & AMY WU, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2005, at 4 
(2006), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_AR_05.pdf. Other 
destination countries for migrants detain just a small fraction of this number, including Greece 
(77,000), the United Kingdom (30,000), France (25,000), Canada (10,000), Germany (4800), 
and Australia (2000). See AUSTL. GOV’T, DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROT., 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND COMMUNITY STATISTICS SUMMARY 4 (2015), https://
www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/immigration-detention-
statistics-30-nov-2015.pdf; GLOB. DET. PROJECT, THE UNCOUNTED: DETENTION OF MIGRANTS 
AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EUROPE 24 (2015), https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/the-
uncounted-the-detention-of-migrants-and-asylum-seekers-in-europe; Germany Immigration 
Detention Profile, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/
countries/europe/germany/introduction.html (last updated Oct. 2014). 
 2 Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/
population_statistics.jsp (last updated May 25, 2017) (showing 188,513 federal inmates). 
 3 CARL TAKEI, MICHAEL TAN & JOANNE LIN, ACLU, SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS: 
WHY AND HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP USING PRIVATE 
PRISONS 6 (2016) [hereinafter SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS], https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/field_document/white_paper_09-30-16_released_for_web-v1-opt.pdf; see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-153, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ADDITIONAL 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF FACILITY COSTS AND 
STANDARDS 9 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666467.pdf.  
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corporations; fifteen percent are in local jails, some of which intermingle 
civil immigration detainees with prisoners held on criminal charges; and 
just twelve percent are in federally-owned facilities.4 In recent years, 
immigration detention has even drawn thousands of children into its 
web, with the addition of two huge “Family Residential Centers” in 
Texas, both run by private prison corporations.5 
This Article argues that the United States’ approach to immigration 
detention must change. A range of alternatives to detention already 
exists, yet detention remains the default, rather than being used as a last 
resort. Furthermore, the most coercive alternative-to-detention 
program, which involves electronic monitoring, is used far more often 
than less restrictive alternatives. Meanwhile, community-based 
alternatives involving case management, which have proven highly 
successful in other countries, are just getting off the ground in the 
United States. 
In addition to making utilitarian and humanitarian arguments for 
shifting the focus (and funding) from detention to alternative programs, 
this Article explores innovative legal arguments for challenging the 
current approach to immigration detention. Part I provides an overview 
of immigration detention and its impact, describing how custody 
determinations are currently made and the various types of harm that 
detention inflicts on taxpayers, detainees, and their U.S. citizen family 
members. Part II sets forth the existing range of alternatives to 
detention, evaluating the strengths and limitations of each option based 
on cost, capacity, compliance rates, accessibility, and the degree of 
infringement on an individual’s liberty, privacy, and dignity. 
In Part III, the Article proposes several legal approaches for 
challenging the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 
failure to consider and use alternatives to detention on a larger scale. 
First, the Article sets forth constitutional arguments based on the 
Excessive Bail Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause. 
Second, the Article examines disability-rights arguments based on the 
Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. Third, the 
Article demonstrates how international human rights law bolsters the 
domestic legal arguments by underscoring relevant principles of 
reasonableness and proportionality. This Part examines the challenges 
associated with each of these arguments as well as their potential for 
propelling greater consideration of alternatives to detention. 
 
 4 SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 1, 9–10, 12. 
 5 See id. at 10; see also Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Immigrant Family Detention Centers Are 
Prison-like, Critics Say, Despite Order to Improve, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015, 6:30 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-immigration-family-detention-20151020-
story.html. 
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I.     IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
A.     Overview of Custody Determinations 
When a noncitizen is apprehended for an immigration violation, 
an officer with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes the 
initial determination about whether to detain the individual.6 If a 
decision is made to detain, the officer must then determine the 
appropriate custody classification level. If a decision is made to release, 
the officer must decide what conditions, if any, should be required.7 
Options include releasing the person on her own recognizance, under 
an order of supervision, upon payment of a bond, or into an electronic 
monitoring program. 
Since March 2013, ICE has been using a national Risk 
Classification Assessment (RCA) to help with these custody 
determinations. The RCA is a computerized algorithm that helps assess 
flight risk and danger to the community based on a number of factors.8 
The factors considered in assessing danger are gathered largely from 
other databases, including criminal history, open warrants, supervision 
history, disciplinary infractions, and gang affiliations.9 The factors used 
to assess flight risk are obtained during an intake interview and include 
community ties, family history, residence history, employment history, 
substance abuse history, immigration history, and legal representation.10 
The creation of the RCA represented an important step forward in 
terms of the decision-making process around detention. But the RCA 
and its implementation raises several important concerns. First, the 
RCA does not distinguish between recent convictions and old ones nor 
consider whether someone who committed a crime has been 
“rehabilitated,” which are factors that risk assessment tools used in the 
criminal context take into account.11 
Second, the RCA’s recommendations are not binding, allowing 
officers to exercise their discretion to override them.12 A study by the 
DHS Office of the Inspector General found that ICE overrode the RCA’s 
 
 6 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (2016). 
 7 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). 
 8 Robert Koulish, Using Risk to Assess the Legal Violence of Mandatory Detention, LAWS, 
Sept. 2016, at 7, http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/5/3/30/pdf. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 8. 
 11 SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 16. 
 12 See Koulish, supra note 8, at 7. 
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recommendations in 7.6% of cases for the general population in 2014.13 
For certain subpopulations, however, this figure is much higher. For 
example, the Center for American Progress found that ICE overrode the 
RCA’s recommendations in nineteen percent of cases involving LGBT 
individuals.14 
Third, the RCA sometimes leaves the decision up to ICE without 
making any recommendation.15 For the general population, this 
occurred in 15.7% of cases, but for LGBT individuals, the decision was 
left up to ICE in sixty-four percent of cases.16 When the RCA does not 
make an explicit recommendation to release, the default for ICE appears 
to be to detain the individual.17 
One of the reasons that ICE officers are choosing to detain 
individuals who could be released is political pressure to fill the beds in 
immigration detention facilities.18 Since 2007, Congress has provided in 
the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act that DHS 
“shall maintain a level of not less than 34,000 detention beds.”19 While 
ICE is technically not required to fill all these beds, this mandate appears 
to be driving detention practices.20 The mere notion that a certain 
number of people should be detained at any given time reduces the 
incentive to explore alternatives and contributes to the arbitrary and 
excessive use of detention.21 
If a noncitizen wants to challenge ICE’s decision to detain or the 
amount of the bond set by ICE, she may request a bond redetermination 
hearing before an immigration judge (IJ).22 The minimum amount of 
 
 13 U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-15-22, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (REVISED) 14 (2015) [hereinafter 
OIG REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION], https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/
OIG_15-22_Feb15.pdf. 
 14 Sharita Gruberg, No Way out: Congress’ Bed Quota Traps LGBT Immigrants in Detention, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 14, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
lgbt/news/2015/05/14/111832/no-way-out-congress-bed-quota-traps-lgbt-immigrants-in-
detention. 
 15 See id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 The RCA gave the option of release seventy percent of the time for LGBT immigrants, 
but ICE chose to detain them without bond sixty-four percent of the time. Id.; see also SHARITA 
GRUBERG & RACHEL WEST, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY: THE U.S. 
ASYLUM SYSTEM’S ROLE IN PROTECTING GLOBAL LGBT RIGHTS 25 (2015), https://
cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/LGBTAsylum-final.pdf. 
 18 See infra note 281. 
 19 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-4, § 562, 129 
Stat. 39, 43 (2015). 
 20 Gruberg, supra note 14. 
 21 See SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 17 (“No corrections system in 
America operates under a similar quota.”). 
 22 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (2016); id. § 1003.19(d). 
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bond that the IJ may set is $1500.23 At the hearing, the noncitizen bears 
the burden of demonstrating that she is not a flight risk or a danger to 
the community.24 Someone who is found to present a danger to persons 
or property is ineligible for bond.25 IJs consider a number of factors in 
determining whether to release a noncitizen on bond and the amount of 
the bond.26 Over the past two decades, IJs have granted roughly half of 
the motions requesting bond redetermination.27 Once an IJ makes a 
bond redetermination, the IJ cannot reconsider that decision unless the 
noncitizen demonstrates a material change in circumstances.28 
However, a noncitizen may appeal the IJ’s bond redetermination 
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).29 
In a large number of cases, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) restricts the discretion of DHS and IJs to set a bond by providing 
that certain categories of people “shall be taken into custody.”30 This 
provision is often referred to as “mandatory detention,” because DHS 
interprets “custody” to mean detention.31 However, many advocates and 
commentators have made persuasive legal arguments, supported by 
federal court precedents, that “custody” should be more broadly 
interpreted to include other forms of restrictions on liberty, such as 
 
 23 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012). 
 24 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8); see also Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1102 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 25 Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 26 Id. at 40. These factors are:  
(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the alien’s length of 
residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s family ties in the United States, and 
whether they may entitle the alien to reside permanently in the United States in the 
future; (4) the alien’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of appearance in 
court; (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity, 
the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the alien’s history 
of immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to flee prosecution or 
otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s manner of entry to the United 
States. 
Id. 
 27 What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond in Immigration Court 
Proceedings?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/438 
(stating that IJs granted bond in forty-six percent of cases over the past twenty years). 
 28 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). 
 29 Id. §§ 1003.1(b)(7), 1003.19(f), 1003.38, 1236.1(d)(3)(i). 
 30 Immigration and Nationality Act § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012); id. § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)(1). 
 31 See Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 632 (2010); Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory 
Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody”, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 
906–11 (2015) (challenging DHS’s interpretation of custody to mean detention); see also 
Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747, 752 (B.I.A. 2009) (finding that the words “custody” and 
“detention” have the same meaning). 
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house arrest and electronic monitoring.32 In addition, based on the 
language of the INA, commentators have argued that “mandatory 
detention” should only be applied to individuals taken into custody by 
ICE immediately after being released from serving their criminal 
sentences, and that it should not be applied to individuals with 
substantial challenges to removal.33 Yet DHS continues to interpret the 
statute broadly. 
One group subject to “mandatory detention” is “arriving aliens,” 
which includes all noncitizens who arrive at an official U.S. port of entry 
or are interdicted at sea.34 Many asylum seekers with no criminal record, 
including thousands of mothers and children fleeing violence in Central 
America, fall into this category.35 In addition, there are “mandatory 
detention” categories based on a wide range of offenses, such as “crimes 
involving moral turpitude” (a term that includes, but is not limited to, 
crimes involving theft or fraud, as well as domestic violence), aggravated 
felonies (a term of art in immigration law that has over two dozen 
definitions and includes certain misdemeanors), controlled substance 
 
 32 See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 63–64 (1995) (holding, in sentencing context, that 
whether an individual is “released” depends on if he remains “subject to [the custodian’s] 
control,” and not whether he is still subject to “jail-type confinement”); Jones v. Cunningham, 
371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963) (explaining that federal habeas law defines custody as restraints on a 
person’s liberty that are “not shared by the public generally”); United States v. Sack, 379 F.3d 
1177 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a defendant who had been ordered to reside in a halfway 
house and failed to return after a day of work could be convicted of escape from custody), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 963 (2005); Torrey, supra note 31, at 906–11; see also SHUTTING DOWN THE 
PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 26.  
 33 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (instructing the 
government to take custody “when the alien is released” from serving his criminal sentence, 
and referring only to aliens who are “deportable” and “inadmissible”); SHUTTING DOWN THE 
PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 27 (discussing legal arguments for interpreting the INA’s custody 
requirement narrowly). But see Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 127 (B.I.A. 2001) (rejecting the 
argument that mandatory detention is limited to aliens who have just been released from 
serving their criminal sentences); Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 (B.I.A. 1999) (interpreting 
§ 236(c) to apply to any noncitizen who is charged with deportability or inadmissibility under 
one of the designated grounds, unless the individual can show that the government is 
“substantially unlikely” to establish the charges). Although the Ninth Circuit recently rejected 
Rojas, four other circuits have agreed with the government’s position. See Preap v. Johnson, 831 
F.3d 1193, 1204–07 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming district court orders requiring bond hearings for 
detainees in California and Washington State who were not immediately detained upon their 
release from relevant criminal custody), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-1363 (U.S. May 11, 2017). 
But see Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015); Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313 
(10th Cir. 2015); Sylvain v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 155–57 (3d Cir. 2013); Hosh v. 
Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 34 Immigration and Nationality Act § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225; 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(h)(1)(i)(B) 
(providing that IJ has no authority to redetermine or set bond for an arriving alien); Oseiwusu, 
22 I. & N. Dec. 19, 19–20 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding IJ has no authority over the detention of 
arriving aliens and therefore lacks authority to consider bond request of an alien returning 
pursuant to a grant of advance parole). 
 35 SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 22. 
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convictions, certain firearms offenses, and various other crimes.36 
Offenses as minor as misdemeanor shoplifting with a one-year sentence 
and possessing more than an ounce of marijuana trigger mandatory 
detention.37 
In many circuits, a person who is subject to mandatory detention 
can be indefinitely detained until a final decision is made in the case, 
which can take months or even years, due to lengthy court backlogs.38 
To date, only the Ninth and Second Circuits have held that 
constitutional concerns require granting individuals subject to 
mandatory detention a bond hearing after 180 days in detention.39 Four 
other circuits have recognized that prolonged detention without a bond 
hearing raises serious due process concerns but have adopted a case-by-
case approach for determining when mandatory detention becomes 
unreasonably prolonged.40 In 2016, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on this issue of prolonged immigration detention without a 
bond hearing.41 By comparison, in the criminal context, “judicial 
decisions regarding bond and release conditions are typically made 
within hours or days of arrest.”42 
Two-thirds of the people in immigration detention (25,000 out of 
37,000) do not have a final order of removal, which means that they may 
ultimately be allowed to remain in the United States. Of these 25,000 
individuals, approximately 15,000 have no criminal record whatsoever. 
Furthermore, in FY 2015, IJs ultimately ruled in favor of nearly twenty 
 
 36 Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 
 37 Id. § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (listing as an aggravated felony “a theft 
offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of 
imprisonment at least one year” (footnote omitted)); id. § 236(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)(1)(B) (providing that anyone who is deportable based on an aggravated felony must 
be taken into custody); id. § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (making any conviction 
for a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance, other than a single offense involving 
possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana, a deportable offense); id. 
§ 236(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (providing that anyone who is deportable under 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) shall be taken into custody). 
 38 Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 3, 2013), http://
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/321. 
 39 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2494 (2016). 
 40 See Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 
486 (1st Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011); Ly v. Hansen, 351 
F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 41 Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489. 
 42 SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 24; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012) 
(directing that decisions regarding conditions of release or detention be made at the initial 
appearance unless a continuation is granted, and limiting the duration of such continuances); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (requiring person arrested to be taken for initial appearance “without 
unnecessary delay”); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320 (2009) (noting that the Rule 5 
presentment requirement “stretches back to the common law”). 
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percent of individuals subject to mandatory detention.43 These facts 
stress that thousands of people are being unnecessarily detained at 
taxpayer expense. 
B.     Cost to Taxpayers 
The United States spends more money on immigration 
enforcement than on the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, Secret 
Service, U.S. Marshalls Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and 
Explosives combined.44 In fact, the nearly $18 billion per year that the 
federal government spends on immigration enforcement is twenty-four 
percent higher than the total amount spent on these other federal law 
enforcement agencies.45 Of that $18 billion, $2 billion goes to 
immigration detention, nearly double the amount that was spent on 
detention in 2005.46 
The average daily cost of immigration detention is now $187 per 
person, for a total of over $5 million per day for the federal 
government.47 Much of that money goes to private prison companies 
that operate seventy-three percent of the immigration detention beds in 
the country.48 The total revenue that the two largest private prison 
contractors—Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO 
Group (GEO)—received from ICE more than doubled from $307 
million in 2008 to over $765 million in 2015.49 Some facilities, such as 
the one in Karnes, Texas that is operated by GEO, cost $32 million to 
 
 43 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CERTAIN CRIMINAL 
CHARGE COMPLETION STATISTICS 2 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/
attachments/2016/08/25/criminal-charge-completion-statistics-201608.pdf. 
 44 Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., U.S. Spends More on Immigration Enforcement 
than on FBI, DEA, Secret Service & All Other Federal Criminal Law Enforcement Agencies 
Combined (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/us-spends-more-immigration-
enforcement-fbi-dea-secret-service-all-other-federal-criminal-law. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 131 (2013), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-
machinery. 
 47 See SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 24 n.75 (explaining that this 
figure “was calculated by dividing ICE’s FY 2016 custody operations cost ($2,316,744,000) by 
365 days to obtain a daily custody operations cost ($6,347,243.84) and dividing that by the 
number of FY 2016 authorized detention beds (34,000)”); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENF’T, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., U.S. COAST GUARD, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2017—VOL. II, at 3, 5, 6 (2017), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY%202017%20Congressional%20Budget%
20Justification%20-%20Volume%202_1.pdf (funding 30,913 detention beds for FY 2017). 
 48 See SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
 49 Id. at 10. 
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build just to detain “low-risk, adult males” and now is used to hold 
women and children.50 This trend of expanding immigration detention 
is at odds with policy changes that the Department of Justice has made 
to phase out the use of private prisons, provide more proportional 
sentences for low-level and nonviolent drug offenses, and use a range of 
calibrated, community-based alternatives to detention. It also inflicts 
enormous suffering on detainees and their families. 
C.     Harm Inflicted on Detainees 
Noncitizens in immigration detention suffer many of the same 
harms as convicted criminals.51 They are torn from their communities, 
separated from their families and friends, locked in cells, forced to wear 
restraints and orange jumpsuits, subjected to strip searches, and 
constantly monitored. In addition, detention has severe financial 
consequences for detainees and their families, since the detainees are no 
longer able to earn an income. 
Another major harm related to detention is that it impedes access 
to counsel and makes it much more difficult to mount a legal defense to 
deportation.52 Detention centers tend to be located in remote parts of 
the country, far from the metropolitan areas where immigration 
attorneys are clustered.53 In removal proceedings overall, forty-five 
percent of immigrants are unrepresented;54 but a 2007 study found that 
eighty-four percent of detainees did not have attorneys.55 More recent 
 
 50 NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY 
COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 8–9 (2013), 
https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-of-Immigation-Detention-
August-2013-FINAL.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FACT SHEET: IMMIGRATION DETENTION: HOW 
CAN THE GOVERNMENT CUT COSTS? (2013), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/
immigration-detention-fact-sheet-jan-2013.pdf. 
 51 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 
1344, 1353 (2014). 
 52 See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing 
Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541 (2009). 
 53 According to Human Rights First, nearly forty percent of ICE’s total bed space is more 
than sixty miles from an urban center, and some are much farther. For example, the Port Isabel 
facility is 155 miles from Corpus Christi, and the LaSalle facility is 220 miles from New Orleans 
and 138 miles from Baton Rouge. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING 
THE U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM—A TWO-YEAR REVIEW 31 (2011), http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf. 
 54 See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2014 STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK F1 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf. 
 55 NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING 
JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM 1 
(2008), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_Evaluation_May
2008_final.pdf. 
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data suggest that this figure has not changed much, with eighty-three 
percent to ninety percent of detainees being unrepresented in Texas, 
where a quarter of the nation’s immigration detainees are located.56 
Detention also impairs the ability to mount a defense by making it 
difficult to obtain evidence from the outside world. Given the number of 
obstacles that must be overcome, many detainees simply give up and 
never file or abandon applications for relief.57 
For people fleeing human rights violations in their own countries, 
the experience of being detained can inflict particularly severe 
emotional harm, re-traumatizing them and exacerbating existing mental 
illnesses, such as posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and major 
depression.58 The psychological harm of detention can even amount to 
torture when measures such as solitary confinement are used.59 
 
 56 TEX. APPLESEED, JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRATION’S HIDDEN POPULATION: PROTECTING THE 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT AND DETENTION 
SYSTEM 10, 13 (2010), https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/10-Immigration
DetentionReportMentalDisabilities.PDF. 
 57 One study found that in New York City, only eighteen percent of represented detainees 
and three percent of unrepresented ones had favorable outcomes in their removal proceedings, 
compared to seventy-four percent of represented non-detainees and thirteen percent of 
unrepresented non-detainees. See Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study 
Report, N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report: Part 1, Accessing Justice: The Availability 
and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363–64 (2011); see 
also EOIR Table 5-1. Asylum Withdrawals by Custody Status by Fiscal Year Completed, U.S. 
COMMISSION INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 670, http://tinyurl.com/hadxcah (last visited June 7, 
2017) (finding that, over a five-year period, detained credible fear claimants withdrew their 
asylum claims in immigration court at more than double the rate of non-detained or released 
claimants: thirteen percent versus five percent). 
 58 See, e.g., Kenneth Carswell et al., The Relationship Between Trauma, Post-Migration 
Problems and the Psychological Well-Being of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 57 INT’L J. SOC. 
PSYCHIATRY 107 (2011) (finding PTSD and distress in refugees and asylum seekers in the 
United Kingdom due to post-migration problems); Cornelis J. Laban et al., Impact of a Long 
Asylum Procedure on the Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorders in Iraqi Asylum Seekers in the 
Netherlands, 192 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 843 (2004); Gillian Morantz et al., The 
Divergent Experiences of Children and Adults in the Relocation Process: Perspectives of Child and 
Parent Refugee Claimants in Montreal, 25 J. REFUGEE STUD. 71 (2011) (finding trends of 
depression in children and parent asylum seekers in Canada); Shana Tabak & Rachel Levitan, 
LGBTI Migrants in Immigration Detention: A Global Perspective, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 
38–42 (2014). 
 59 The psychological effects of solitary confinement may become irreversible after fifteen 
days. See Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur of Human Rights Council), Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for 
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, at 9, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011); Manfred Nowak (Special Rapporteur of Human Rights Council), 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Implementation of Human Rights Instruments, at 
23–24, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008); see also MIKE CORRADINI, KRISTINE HUSKEY & 
CHRISTY FUJIO, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BURIED ALIVE: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN 
THE US DETENTION SYSTEM (2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Solitary-
Confinement-April-2013-full.pdf; HEARTLAND ALL. NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. & 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INVISIBLE IN ISOLATION: THE USE OF SEGREGATION AND 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2012) [hereinafter INVISIBLE IN 
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Detention can also inflict grave physical harm, due to delayed or 
denied medical care, physical and sexual violence, and the risk of 
suicide. Even ICE’s most recent detention standards, the 2011 
Performance Based National Detention Standards, fall short of the 
National Commission on Correctional Health Care’s standards for 
medical care in prisons and jails.60 Furthermore, nearly half of the 
detained population are held in facilities that operate under older, 
weaker standards.61 In numerous cases where people have died in 
immigration detention centers, ICE’s internal reviews identified 
violations of medical standards as contributing factors to their deaths.62 
These violations included failure to meet health care needs in a timely 
manner, failure to refer people to higher-level medical care, inadequate 
staffing of medical personnel, and inadequate screening for illnesses.63 
Detention centers also fail to take adequate precautions to prevent 
suicide. Nearly ten percent of the deaths in ICE custody during the 
Obama administration were suicides.64 Since 2003, fourteen detainees 
have died in the Eloy Detention Center in Arizona alone, five of them 
suicides, making it the deadliest facility in the country.65 
Certain populations face unique challenges to obtaining medical 
care in detention. For example, women are often denied screenings that 





 60 See, e.g., ACLU, WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE ACLU FOR A HEARING ON “HOLIDAY ON 
ICE: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S NEW IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
STANDARDS” (2012), https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-statement-hearing-titled-holiday-ice-us-
department-homeland-securitys-new-immigration; ACLU, DET. WATCH NETWORK & NAT’L 
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., FATAL NEGLECT: HOW ICE IGNORES DEATHS IN DETENTION (2016) 
[hereinafter FATAL NEGLECT], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/fatal_
neglect_acludwnnijc.pdf; FLA. IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CTR., DYING FOR DECENT CARE: BAD 
MEDICINE IN IMMIGRATION CUSTODY (2009), http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aijustice/
pages/273/attachments/original/1390427524/DyingForDecentCare.pdf?1390427524;  U.S. 
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 32–36 (2015) [hereinafter WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE 
FOR ALL], http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf. 
 61 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-153, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF FACILITY 
COSTS AND STANDARDS 30–32 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666467.pdf. 
 62 FATAL NEGLECT, supra note 60; see also US: Deaths in Immigration Detention, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (July 7, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/07/us-deaths-
immigration-detention.  
 63 FATAL NEGLECT, supra note 60, at 6. 
 64 Id. at 5. 
 65 SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 1. 
 66 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED AND DISMISSED: WOMEN’S STRUGGLES TO OBTAIN 
HEALTH CARE IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION 43–63 (2009), https://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wrd0309web_0.pdf. 
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Pregnant women, in particular, face special challenges, as they do not 
receive proper prenatal, delivery, or post-partum care.67 Furthermore, 
survivors of sexual assault and gender-based violence fail to receive 
timely treatment and counseling.68 Persons living with HIV often 
encounter gaps in receiving their medications or changes in their 
medication, especially when they are transferred from one detention 
center to another.69 In addition, transgender individuals are often 
denied hormone therapy, even though ICE’s detention guidelines 
provide that individuals receiving such therapy before being detained 
should continue receiving it in detention.70 
Detainees are also vulnerable to physical and sexual assaults.71 
According to a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), ICE’s data system described 215 incidents of sexual assault in 
immigration detention from October 2009 through March 2013.72 The 
actual number may be much higher, since forty percent of the 
allegations were never even reported to ICE headquarters.73 In addition, 
fourteen percent of the calls placed to a hotline for reporting abuse did 
not go through.74 Women and LGBT detainees are especially vulnerable 
to abuse in detention.75 The Center for American Progress documented 
 
 67 Id. at 52–57. 
 68 Id. at 57–61; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED AND AT RISK: SEXUAL ABUSE 
AND HARASSMENT IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2010) [hereinafter DETAINED 
AND AT RISK], https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0810webwcover.pdf. 
 69 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHRONIC INDIFFERENCE: HIV/AIDS SERVICES FOR 
IMMIGRANTS DETAINED BY THE UNITED STATES (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/us1207web.pdf; see also Homer D. Venters, Jennifer McNeely & Allen S. Keller, HIV 
Screening and Care for Immigration Detainees, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J., Dec. 2009, at 89, 92 
(“ICE detainees known to have HIV/AIDS are afforded a level of care at odds with accepted 
standards of practice, even for correctional settings.”). 
 70 Adam Frankel & Christina Fialho, Trapped in Detention, Transgender Immigrants Face 
New Traumas, MSNBC (Aug. 29, 2015, 2:04 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trapped-
detention-transgender-immigrants-face-new-traumas (“[T]ransgender women are frequently 
denied access to health care, including hormone replacement therapy, and in certain rare 
instances, HIV medication.”). 
 71 DETAINED AND AT RISK, supra note 68; NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, 
NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/226680.pdf. 
 72 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-38, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD STRENGTHEN DHS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS SEXUAL ABUSE 14 
(2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL ABUSE], http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
659145.pdf; see also Documents Obtained by ACLU Show Sexual Abuse of Immigration 
Detainees Is Widespread National Problem, ACLU (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/news/
documents-obtained-aclu-show-sexual-abuse-immigration-detainees-widespread-national-
problem (documenting nearly 200 sexual assaults in immigration detention from 2007–2011). 
 73 GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 72, at 19. 
 74 Id. at 23. 
 75 SHARITA GRUBERG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DIGNITY DENIED: LGBT IMMIGRANTS IN 
U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION 1 (2013) [hereinafter DIGNITY DENIED], https://
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ImmigrationEnforcement.pdf; 
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nearly 200 incidents of abuse against LGBT immigration detainees 
between 2008 and 2013,76 and the GAO found that one in five 
“substantiated” cases of sexual assault in immigration detention 
involved a transgender detainee.77 Although DHS has promulgated a 
regulation to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), it 
falls short of PREA’s standards and does not immediately apply to 
privately operated detention facilities, which hold the vast majority of 
immigration detainees in the country.78 
D.     Harm Inflicted on U.S. Citizen Children 
Approximately 4.5 million U.S. citizen children have a parent who 
is in the country without legal immigration status.79 These children live 
in a state of constant uncertainty about their lives.80 When a parent is 
apprehended and detained by ICE, the stress increases exponentially. 
Children often experience great difficulty in communicating with 
detained parents, due to distance, strict visiting rules, and the expense of 
telephone calls to detention centers.81 These barriers to communication 
cause emotional harm and leave some children feeling like their parents 
have simply “disappeared.”82 The financial stress that detention inflicts 
on a family can also lead to instability in housing and in caregiving 
arrangements, which further exacerbates emotional harm.83 In addition, 
many spouses of detained individuals struggle with depression, which 
impacts the cognitive and behavioral development of their U.S. citizen 
 
SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 1–2 (describing a guard responsible for 
transporting detainees from the Hutto detention facility to the airport for deportation sexually 
assaulted multiple women on the side of the road between 2009 and 2010). 
 76 DIGNITY DENIED, supra note 75, at 5. 
 77 GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 72, at 60–61. 
 78 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (2012); 6 C.F.R. § 115.42 (2017); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION 
AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE POLICY NO. 11062.2, SEXUAL ABUSE AND ASSAULT PREVENTION AND 
INTERVENTION (2014), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/saapi2.pdf. The U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, a bipartisan, independent congressional commission, concluded 
that DHS’s regulation falls short of PREA’s standards. See WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, 
supra note 60, at 70–91. 
 79 Luis H. Zayas & Laurie Cook Heffron, Disrupting Young Lives: How Detention and 
Deportation Affect US-born Children of Immigrants, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Nov. 2016), http://
www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/newsletter/2016/11/detention-deportation.aspx. 
 80 Id. 
 81 HEATHER KOBALL ET AL., URBAN INST. & MIGRATION POLICY INST., HEALTH AND SOCIAL 
SERVICE NEEDS OF US-CITIZEN CHILDREN WITH DETAINED OR DEPORTED IMMIGRANT 
PARENTS, at vi–vii (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/
2000405-Health-and-Social-Service-Needs-of-US-Citizen-Children-with-Detained-or-
Deported-Immigrant-Parents.pdf. 
 82 Id. at vii. 
 83 Id. at 7. 
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children.84 At the same time, child welfare services face significant 
challenges in providing services to families with detained parents.85 All 
of these factors affect children’s cognitive and emotional development, 
as well as performance in school. The detention of a parent is strongly 
associated with depression, anxiety, self-stigma, aggression, and 
withdrawal among children.86 Increasing the use of alternatives to 
detention would help reduce these humanitarian costs. 
II.     ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION 
ICE has a range of options that it can use in lieu of detention. As 
discussed below, however, many of these options are underutilized. 
These include releasing an individual on her own recognizance, through 
a grant of parole, under an order of supervision, upon payment of a 
bond, into an electronic monitoring program, or into a community-
based case management program.87 While electronic monitoring is the 
most restrictive and invasive of these options, it is the only option that 
ICE considers an official Alternative-to-Detention (ATD) Program.88 
Furthermore, community-based case management programs, which 
have proven highly successful in other countries, are just getting off the 
ground in the United States. 
Despite the range of alternatives to detention that are currently 
available, ICE still chooses to detain far more people than it releases. In 
FY 2013, ICE released 113,690 people under one of above-mentioned 
options, while it detained 440,557—nearly four times as many.89 These 
figures indicate that ICE is not always considering less restrictive 
alternatives before resorting to detention. This Part discusses the 
strengths and limitations of various alternatives. 
A.     Release on Own Recognizance 
A large percentage of the immigrants who are currently detained 
by ICE present no threat to public safety. An analysis performed by the 
 
 84 Id. at 5. 
 85 Id. at 27. 
 86 Zayas & Heffron, supra note 79. 
 87 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION: 
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM 
EFFECTIVENESS 7 (2014) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION], http://
www.gao.gov/assets/670/666911.pdf. 
 88 Id. at 8–9 (referring to the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) as “the 
ATD program”). 
 89 Id. at 6, 8. 
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Associated Press found that 18,690 out of the 32,000 individuals in 
immigration detention on January 25, 2009 (fifty-eight percent) had no 
criminal conviction.90 A similar analysis conducted by the Huffington 
Post in 2011 found that 13,185 out of the 32,300 individuals in 
immigration detention (forty-one percent) had no criminal history.91 
Since ICE does not report the percent of detainees with criminal 
convictions, it is difficult to obtain current and reliable data on this 
issue. ICE does, however, report the percentage of people removed from 
the country who had a criminal conviction. Between 2011 and 2015, ICE 
has increased its focus on apprehending and removing immigrants who 
have been convicted of crimes.92 In FY 2014, ICE reported that eighty-
five percent of removals from the country’s interior (as opposed to at 
the border) involved individuals with a criminal conviction.93 However, 
a quarter of those people had only been convicted of a misdemeanor 
carrying a maximum sentence of one year.94 Furthermore, 
approximately 1700 women and children are detained in “Family 
Residential Centers,” where only individuals without criminal records 
can be held.95 
Those who are not a threat to public safety and present no flight 
risk may be released on their own recognizance, which does not require 
posting a bond or complying with supervision requirements.96 This 
option avoids restricting liberty and is the least expensive option. ICE’s 
Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers has advised that 
“[f]or many families, release on recognizance with information about 
rights and responsibilities and referrals to legal services and psycho-
 
 90 See DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRANT 
DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT 
RESPONSIBILITIES? 20–22 (2009), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept
1009.pdf. 
 91 Elise Foley, No Conviction, No Freedom: Immigration Authorities Locked 13,000 in 
Limbo, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/27/
immigration-detention_n_1231618.html. 
 92 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT 
AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 5 (2014), https://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-ice-immigration-removals.pdf. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 10. 
 95 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, REPORT OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS 109 (2016) [hereinafter DHS ADVISORY REPORT], https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf;  see  also 
Immigration Detention Map & Statistics, CIVIC, http://www.endisolation.org/resources/
immigration-detention (showing a daily population of 1111 at the South Texas Residential 
Facility in Dilley, Texas and 616 at the Karnes County Correctional Center in Karnes City, 
Texas) (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
 96 GAO REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 87, at 7. 
MAROUF.38.6.6 (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2017  8:14 PM 
2017] ALT E RN AT I VE S  T O  D E T E N T IO N  2157 
 
 
social supports is sufficient to ensure compliance with immigration 
proceedings.”97 
A pilot study conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice in 2000 
found that seventy-eight percent of asylum seekers who are released 
without any supervision comply with court proceedings.98 Yet in FY 
2013, only around 30,000 people were released on their own 
recognizance––less than seven percent of the people detained that year, 
suggesting that this option is greatly underutilized.99 
B.     Parole 
Parole is another option that is rarely used at the present time. 
Even if someone is subject to mandatory detention as an “arriving 
alien”—as many asylum seekers are—ICE has discretion to release that 
person on parole in certain situations. Specifically, parole may be 
granted for urgent humanitarian reasons, a medical emergency, when 
there is a significant public benefit, or for a legitimate law enforcement 
objective.100 In 2009, ICE issued a memorandum requiring that arriving 
aliens found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture be 
automatically reviewed for parole eligibility.101 The memorandum 
provided that parole should be granted after a positive credible fear 
determination, as long as the person is not a flight risk and poses no 
danger to the community.102 But ICE is not implementing this guidance. 
In fact, ICE trial attorneys “vigorously contest” the release of mothers 
and children on parole.103 In FY 2013, ICE granted parole to only 
around 6000 people, just one percent of all the individuals detained that 
year.104 
 
 97 See DHS ADVISORY REPORT supra note 95, at 15. 
 98 1 VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE INS: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT TO THE IMMIGRATION 




 99 GAO REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 87, at 8. 
 100 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5, 235.3(b)(2)(iii) (2016). 
 101 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, DIRECTIVE NO. 11002.1, PAROLE OF ARRIVING 
ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE para. 8.2 (2009), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hd-parole_of_arriving_aliens_found_credible_
fear.pdf. 
 102 Id. para. 6.2. 
 103 A One-Week Snapshot: Human Rights First at Dilley Family Detention Facility Post-
Flores Ruling, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/one-
week-snapshot-human-rights-first-dilley-family-detention-facility-post-flores-ruling. 
 104 GAO REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 87, at 8. 
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C.     Bond 
Bond is a highly effective means of ensuring appearance at court 
hearings, and it is available only to individuals who have been found not 
to pose a danger. During FY 2015, eighty-six percent of those released 
on bond by an immigration judge appeared at their court hearings.105 
Yet judges have historically granted only ten percent of bond 
redetermination motions. In FY 2016, this figure was significantly 
higher at thirty percent.106 Although this is an improvement, it is still far 
lower than the percent of criminal defendants detained without bail. A 
2012 study found that in New York, for example, eighty percent of the 
noncitizens apprehended by ICE are detained without bond, but only 
one percent of criminal defendants are held without bail.107 ICE has 
been even harsher than immigration judges in setting bonds. In ninety-
four percent of cases where a detainee requested a bond redetermination 
hearing before an immigration judge, ICE refused to set any bond at 
all.108 
Although bond is effective in satisfying the government’s interests, 
it often does not help immigrants actually get released from detention 
because they cannot afford to pay the bond.109 Immigration bonds do 
 
 105 What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond in Immigration Court 
Proceedings?, supra note 27. 
 106 Id.; see also GAO REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 87, at 8 (stating 
that around 41,000 people total were released on bond in FY 2013, which represents only ten 
percent of the number detained that year). 
 107 NYU SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, FAMILIES FOR 
FREEDOM, INSECURE COMMUNITIES, DEVASTATED FAMILIES: NEW DATA ON IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY 9 (2012), http://
immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NYC-FOIA-Report-2012-
FINAL.pdf. 
 108 What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond in Immigration Court 
Proceedings?, supra note 27. 
 109 OLGA BYRNE, ELEANOR ACER & ROBYN BARNARD, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, LIFELINE ON 
LOCKDOWN: INCREASED U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 25 (2016) [hereinafter LIFELINE 
ON LOCKDOWN], http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Lifeline-on-Lockdown_
0.pdf (stating that seventy percent of the attorneys surveyed nationwide reported that ICE sets 
bonds too high); ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED 
REMOVAL 47–48 (2016), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection
.pdf (reporting that the DHS often imposes bonds that are too high for families to afford and 
then defends those amounts at bond redetermination hearings in immigration court); INTER-
AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION OF REFUGEE AND MIGRANT 
FAMILIES AND UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 71 (2015) 
[hereinafter IACHR 2015 REPORT], http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-
Migrants-US.pdf (“[A]t the culmination of bond hearings, immigration judges have been 
setting extremely high bond amounts, up to $15,000 or more, such that those who may qualify 
to be released are unable to meet the required amount.”). 
MAROUF.38.6.6 (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2017  8:14 PM 
2017] ALT E RN AT I VE S  T O  D E T E N T IO N  2159 
 
 
not take into consideration an individual’s financial circumstances.110 
Furthermore, there is a statutorily mandated minimum bond amount of 
$1500.111 Although this may not seem very high, it still results in 
detention based solely on indigence. By comparison, in 2008, only 
thirteen percent of defendants in New York City who were arrested on 
non-felony charges and given a bond of $1000 or less were able to post 
bail at arraignment.112 
In FY 2016, the median bond amount in immigration cases was 
$8000, with sixty percent of all bonds set between $5000 and $12,600.113 
Since immigration bonds must be paid in full cash value, they are even 
harder to post than bail in criminal cases, where defendants can 
typically put down a deposit or provide some type of collateral.114 The 
people most vulnerable to harm in immigration detention are often the 
ones least likely to be able to post a bond.115 And when people are able 
to post a bond, the financial consequences for the family can be 
disastrous, resulting in the loss of housing or other necessities.116  
While the criminal justice system has been moving away from its 
historical focus on monetary bonds as the principle method of release 
from detention, the immigration system has not yet absorbed the 
lessons learned in the criminal context.117 As a substantial body of 
research has shown that monetary bonds fail to deter criminal activity, 
are poor predictors of flight risk, result in detention based on economic 
status, and disproportionately affect minorities, it is critical to consider 
 
 110 LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 109, at 25 (“[I]t is not clear whether ICE has issued 
any formal guidance to field offices instructing ICE officers how to assess an individual’s ability 
to pay—with respect to families in detention or individuals generally. Reports from attorneys 
serving asylum seekers and other immigrants do not indicate that any such policy has been 
implemented.”). 
 111 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012). 
 112 New York City: Bail Penalizes the Poor, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 2, 2010, 11:45 PM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/02/new-york-city-bail-penalizes-poor. 
 113 See What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond in Immigration Court 
Proceedings?, supra note 27. 
 114 SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 30. 
 115 For example, transgender individuals have higher rates of poverty, unemployment, 
family rejection, and social isolation, making it particularly difficult for them to post a bond. 
See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN 
TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER 
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2–7 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/
reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf; see also María Inés Taracena, Free Nicoll: Bond Fundraiser Begins 
for Transgender Woman in All-Male Immigration Detention Center, TUCSON WKLY. (Apr. 15, 
2015, 11:30 AM), http://www.tucsonweekly.com/TheRange/archives/2015/04/15/free-nicoll-
bond-fundraiser-begins-for-transgender-woman-in-all-male-immigration-detention-center. 
 116 Wiseman, supra note 51, at 1357, 1360–61. 
 117 See, e.g., Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from 
Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 197–202 (2016) (discussing the move away 
from financial bonds in the criminal context based on substantial research demonstrating the 
inefficiency and unfairness of that system). 
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non-monetary alternatives to immigration detention.118 The arbitrary 
nature of bond-setting in removal proceedings, where there are no 
meaningful standards for setting bond amounts, makes it even more 
urgent to consider non-monetary alternatives.119  
D.     Supervised Release 
An alternative that does not discriminate against indigent 
individuals is supervised release, which involves being released under an 
order that requires compliance with certain conditions. These 
conditions often include being required to check-in regularly with ICE, 
obtaining permission from ICE before leaving the city or state, keeping 
ICE informed of any address change, having a curfew, receiving random 
home visits by ICE, and obtaining travel documents to facilitate 
removal.120 
Currently, only ICE makes decisions about supervised release. 
Unlike criminal judges, immigration judges only make bond 
redeterminations; they do not release individuals on their own 
recognizance or under orders of supervision. In FY 2013, only 13,000 
people were released under an order of supervision, making it the least 
utilized alternative after parole.121 
Studies show that supervised release programs can be very effective 
in both the immigration and criminal contexts.122 The Vera Institute of 
Justice reported an eighty-four percent compliance rate among asylum 
seekers who received minimal supervision, which is nearly identical to 
the compliance rate among individuals released on bond.123 Supervised 
release may be even more effective if immigrants are given clearer 
instructions—in a language they can understand—regarding their 
release conditions.124 A pilot supervised release program for defendants 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 209–12. 
 120 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.5(a), 241.13(h) (2016). 
 121 GAO REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 87, at 8. 
 122 See THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 214994, STATE 
COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990–2004: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN 
STATE COURTS 5 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf; Criminal Justice 
Section, State Policy Implementation Project, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/criminal_justice/spip_handouts.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited May 17, 
2017); see also Wiseman, supra note 51, at 1363. 
 123 VERA INST. REPORT, supra note 98, at 6. 
 124 See DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 105 (“Many NGOs have complained that 
detainees who are released do not receive effective communication of their release conditions 
or options, including, for non-Spanish speakers, instructions in a language they understand 
about when and where to appear in court.”); Letter from CARA Family Detention Pro Bono 
Project, to Sarah Saldaña, Director, Immigration and Customs Enf’t Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
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in New York, operated by the Criminal Justice Agency, reported a 
compliance rate of eighty-seven percent.125 
One of the main objections to supervised release programs pertains 
to the costs involved and limited capacity.126 While supervised release is 
more expensive than bond release due to the human supervision 
involved, it is still far less expensive than detention. According to data 
provided by the U.S. Courts, pretrial detention is ten times more 
expensive than the cost of supervision by a pretrial services officer in the 
federal system.127 The daily cost of pretrial detention per federal 
defendant is $73 (an annual cost of $26,655), while the daily cost of 
supervision by pretrial service officers is just $7.24 (an annual cost of 
$2644).128 The District of Columbia now relies almost exclusively on 
supervision, rather than bail, for pretrial defendants, and this approach 
has proven highly successful, resulting in very low rates of absconding 
and violent crimes by those released.129 
E.     Electronic Monitoring 
The most restrictive and invasive alternative to being detained is 
the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP), which involves 
electronic monitoring.130 ISAP was initiated in 2004 as a five-year pilot 
program that operated in ten cities.131 In 2009, the program became 
national, receiving $62 million in funding from Congress. DHS hired a 
private, for-profit company, Behavioral Interventions Incorporated (BI), 
to administer, track, monitor, and provide reports on ISAP 
 
(July 27, 2015) [hereinafter CARA Letter], http://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/
65278. 
 125 Mayor de Blasio Announces $17.8 Million to Reduce Unnecessary Jail Time for People 
Waiting for Trial, NYC.GOV (July 8, 2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/
471-15/mayor-de-blasio-17-8-million-reduce-unnecessary-jail-time-people-waiting-trial. 
 126 See, e.g., FLA. LEGISLATURE OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY, NO. 10-08, PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS’ COMPLIANCE WITH NEW 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS IS MIXED 2 (2010), http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/
Reports/pdf/1008rpt.pdf (“[T]he amount of funds provided by local governments 
to . . . [pretrial release] programs ranged from $65,000 in Bay County to $5.2 million in 
Broward County.”). 
 127 Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System, U.S. COURTS 
(July 18, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervision-costs-significantly-less-
incarceration-federal-system. 
 128 Id. 
 129 TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MONEY AS A 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER: THE JUDGE’S DECISION TO RELEASE OR DETAIN A 
DEFENDANT PRETRIAL 57, 60 (2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/
029517.pdf. 
 130 OIG REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 13, at 3. 
 131 Id. 
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participants.132 In 2010, GEO Group acquired BI and took over the 
program.133 Congress appropriated $90 million to fund the most recent 
version of ISAP in 2014.134 As of February 2014, 22,201 individuals were 
participating in ISAP.135 
There are two versions of ISAP, both of which involve electronic 
monitoring: the “Technology-Only” version and a “Full-Service” version 
that includes “case management” services. In February 2014, there were 
11,368 people in the Full-Service program and 10,833 in the 
Technology-Only program.136 The electronic monitoring is done either 
through a GPS monitoring device attached to the participant’s ankle 
(“ankle bracelet”) or through telephonic reporting with voice 
recognition software. 
Electronic monitoring through ISAP is highly effective. In Contract 
Year 2013, the Full-Service program had a 99.9% compliance rate for all 
court hearings, including the final removal hearing, and a 79.4% 
compliance rate with orders of removal among those who lost their 
cases and were ordered removed.137 Unfortunately, ICE has not been 
collecting similar data for the Technology-Only program, although it is 
now improving data collection efforts.138 
In addition to being highly effective, electronic monitoring is also 
much cheaper than detention. Under the Technology-Only program, 
telephonic monitoring costs just $0.17 per participant per day, and GPS 
monitoring costs $4.41 per participant per day.139 The “Full-Service” 
option that includes case management costs $8.37 per participant per 
day.140 ICE estimated that the average cost per ISAP participant would 
be $5.16 in FY 2016, compared to $123.54 per day for detention.141 Yet 
 
 132 Contract with BI Incorporated for providing professional support services for ISAPII for 
the ICE/DRO/Alternatives to Detention Unit, Period of Performance 7/20/2009–7/19/2014, 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FOIA/2016/biIncorporatedHSCECR
09D00002.pdf. 
 133 The GEO Group Announces $415 Million Acquisition of B.I. Incorporated, BUS. WIRE 
(Dec. 21, 2010, 8:41 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101221005564/en/GEO-
Group-Announces-415-Million-Acquisition-B.I; see also Alternatives to Immigration Detention: 
Less Costly and More Humane than Federal Lock-Up, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/assets/aclu_atd_fact_sheet_final_v.2.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2017) [hereinafter 
Alternatives to Immigration Detention]. 
 134 OIG REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 13, at 3. 
 135 See id. at 4. 
 136 Id.  
 137 See Alternatives to Immigration Detention, supra note 133, at 2 (citing Intensive 
Supervision Appearance Program II: Contract Year 2013 Annual Report (BI Incorp. 2013)); see 
also GAO REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 87. 
 138 GAO REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 87, at 31. 
 139 OIG REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 13, at 4. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Backgrounder: Alternatives to Detention (ATD): History and Recommendations, 
LUTHERAN IMMIGR. & REFUGEE SERV., http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LIRS-
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Congress allocated only $122 million to ISAP in FY2016, which is less 
than four percent of the $3.3 billion total spent on detention and 
removal.142 
Although electronic monitoring is a cost-effective alternative, it is 
also more restrictive, more invasive of privacy, and a greater affront to 
dignity than any of the other alternatives discussed above.143 The GPS 
device must be charged for several hours a day, which means that 
participants in the program have to plug themselves into the wall, 
constraining their movement for hours at a time. This can be a 
degrading and dehumanizing experience.144 For participants who are 
pregnant or have young children, having to stay in one place for hours is 
especially difficult.145 Another drawback of the GPS device is that it is 
heavy and can become painful.146 Wearing an ankle bracelet is also 
stigmatizing, since society often assumes that individuals wearing ankle 
bracelets are criminals, which can lead to discrimination and create 
problems at work or in school.147 
 
Backgrounder-on-Alternatives-to-Detention-7.6.15.pdf (last visited June 26, 2017); see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2016, at 46 (2015), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS_FY2016_Congressional_Budget_
Justification.pdf. 
 142 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 5 (2015), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf. 
 143 See, e.g., Eric Maes & Benjamin Mine, Some Reflections on the Possible Introduction of 
Electronic Monitoring as an Alternative to Pre-Trial Detention in Belgium, 52 HOW. J. CRIM. 
JUST. 144, 157 (2013) (arguing, inter alia, that electronic monitoring raises numerous privacy 
concerns). 
 144 Letter from Eleni Wolfe-Roubatis, Centro Legal de la Raza, to Megan H. Mack, Officer of 
Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and John Roth, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. 6–14 (Apr. 20, 2016), http://centrolegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
Complaint-to-OCRCL-Cover-Letter.pdf (alleging violations of due process and liberty rights of 
asylum seekers by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement through the use of ISAP); John 
Burnett, As Asylum Seekers Swap Prison Beds for Ankle Bracelets, Same Firm Profits, NPR (Nov. 
13, 2015, 4:56 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/13/455790454/as-asylum-seekers-swap-
prison-beds-for-ankle-bracelets-same-firm-profits; Maya Schenwar, The Quiet Horrors of 
House Arrest, Electronic Monitoring, and Other Alternative Forms of Incarceration, MOTHER 
JONES (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/01/house-arrest-
surveillance-state-prisons.  
 145 Schenwar, supra note 144; E. C. Gogolak, Ankle Monitors Weigh on Immigrant Mothers 
Released from Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/
nyregion/ankle-monitors-weigh-on-immigrant-mothers-released-from-detention.html. 
 146 Kyle Barron & Cinthya Santos Briones, No Alternative: Ankle Monitors Expand the Reach 
of Immigration Detention, NACLA (Jan. 6, 2015), http://nacla.org/news/2015/01/06/no-
alternative-ankle-monitors-expand-reach-immigration-detention (“The use of the ankle 
monitors requires a period of physical adjustment, causing swelling of the foot and leg, as well 
as severe cramps. The person must be tethered to an outlet as the device is charged for hours, 
twice every day. . . . The greatest challenge that people under ISAP face with the use of the 
monitor is the psychological effects.”); M.M., Living with an Ankle Bracelet, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (July 16, 2015, 12:31 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/16/living-
with-an-ankle-bracelet#.1UaJaftgJ. 
 147 See sources cited supra note 146. 
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Given the deprivations of liberty, privacy, and dignity imposed by 
ISAP, commentators and advocates have persuasively argued that this 
program is actually a form of “custody.”148 At least one federal district 
court has implicitly recognized that electronic monitoring and twelve-
hour curfews under ICE’s ISAP constitute “custody.”149 If this 
interpretation were widely adopted, half of the detainees subject to 
“mandatory detention” would be eligible for release into the ISAP 
program.150 
As the most restrictive alternative to detention, electronic 
monitoring should be reserved for high-risk individuals. When ISAP 
became a national program in 2009, ICE limited it to high-priority 
categories that included people who already had final orders of removal 
and individuals in removal proceedings at risk of absconding. But ISAP 
has since become the default alternative-to-detention program and is 
often used for very low-risk individuals, including mothers released 
from family detention.151 Currently, there is a lack of clarity around the 
criteria for enrolling individuals in ISAP, as well as for having electronic 
monitors removed.152 If ICE relied more on other alternatives to 
detention, ISAP’s position as the most restrictive option on the 
spectrum would become clear. 
F.     Community-Based Alternatives 
Early explorations of community-based alternatives in the 1980s 
and 1990s involved partnerships between immigration authorities and 
 
 148 See, e.g., RUTGERS SCH. OF LAW-NEWARK, IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC & AM. FRIENDS 
SERV. COMM., FREED BUT NOT FREE: A REPORT EXAMINING THE CURRENT USE OF 
ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION 24–25 (2012), https://www.afsc.org/sites/
afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Freed-but-not-Free.pdf; Featured Issue: Adult Detention, 
AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/enforcement/
adult-detention (citing various AILA documents discussing the definition of “custody”); see 
also sources cited supra note 32. 
 149 See Nguyen v. B.I. Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Or. 2006). 
 150 See Koulish, supra note 8, at 9. The study found that only twenty-five percent of 
mandatory detainees in Baltimore were considered “high risk” under the RCA, fifty-eight 
percent were medium risk, and seventeen percent were actually low risk. Id. 
 151 See DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 17 (“[I]t appears that ICE is routinely 
requiring ISAP, including ankle monitors, as a general condition of release from family 
detention.”); CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 109, at 48 (“[I]t appears that electronic monitoring 
is being used extensively without full individualized assessments of whether an asylum seeker is 
a non-appearance risk.”). 
 152 See, e.g., CARA Letter, supra note 124. The CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project 
consists of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, the American Immigration 
Council, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for 
Education and Legal Services. 
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faith-based organizations.153 These programs proved very successful. 
Catholic Charities of New Orleans’s program achieved a compliance 
rate of ninety-seven percent at a cost of just $1430 per year per person 
and Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service’s (LIRS) program 
achieved a ninety-six percent appearance rate at just three percent of the 
cost of detention.154 From 1997 to 2000, the Immigration and 
Nationality Service funded the Vera Institute for Justice to conduct an 
“Appearance Assistance Program” that focused on case management.155 
This program involved 500 participants and achieved an overall court 
appearance rate of ninety-one percent.156 
In recent years, ICE renewed its interest in exploring community-
based supervision programs. In June 2013, ICE entered into an 
unfunded contract with LIRS to release immigrants from detention into 
a community-based model.157 Under this contract, ICE referred 
immigrants with specific vulnerabilities to LIRS’s partners in several 
pilot sites.158 LIRS has established coalitions of community partners in 
these locations that provide case management services, legal services, 
and housing. In addition, LIRS tracks referral practices, cost, and 
compliance to assess the model’s effectiveness. 
Similarly, in January 2014, ICE launched a small pilot program 
with the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and its Catholic 
Charities partners to release vulnerable detainees into a community-
based model that provides case management, legal services, and holistic 
support.159 The participants include families, asylum-seekers, torture-
survivors, primary caregivers, the elderly, and victims of crime.160 These 
 
 153 See CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., THE NEEDLESS DETENTION OF 
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 26–28 (2000), https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/
atrisk4.pdf; MIGRATION & REFUGEE SERVS., U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS & CTR. 
FOR MIGRATION STUDIES, UNLOCKING HUMAN DIGNITY: A PLAN TO TRANSFORM THE U.S. 
IMMIGRANT DETENTION SYSTEM 28 (2015) [hereinafter UNLOCKING HUMAN DIGNITY], http://
www.usccb.org/about/migration-and-refugee-services/upload/unlocking-human-dignity-
report.pdf; Backgrounder: Alternatives to Detention (ATD): History and Recommendations, 
supra note 141. 
 154 Backgrounder: Alternatives to Detention (ATD): History and Recommendations, supra 
note 141. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id.; see also VERA INST. REPORT, 98 note.  
 157 Issue Brief: The Community Support Initiative: A Model National Project to Prove the 
Effectiveness of Alternatives to Immigration Detention, LUTHERAN IMMIGR. & REFUGEE SERV., 
http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/ISSUE-BRIEF-LIRS-Alternatives-to-Detention-
Project-Overview-final.pdf (last visited June 6, 2017). 
 158 Id.; see also Access to Justice: LIRS’s Alternatives to Immigration Detention Project, 
LUTHERAN IMMIGR. & REFUGEE SERV., http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/LIRS_ATJ_
overview.pdf (last visited June 6, 2017). These sites included: Tucson/Phoenix, Austin/San 
Antonio, Boston, Chicago, New York/Newark, Seattle/Tacoma, and Minneapolis/St. Paul. 
 159 UNLOCKING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 153, at 13. 
 160 Id. at 28 n.46. 
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pilot programs laid the groundwork for ICE’s first large-scale 
community-based supervision program. 
In 2015, legal challenges to detention conditions for children 
created a more urgent need for a larger, community-based alternative-
to-detention program. In August 2015, U.S. District Court Judge Dolly 
M. Gee in the Central District of California found that the two “Family 
Residential Centers” in Karnes and Dilley, Texas, were not in 
compliance with a 1997 settlement in a case called Flores v. Meese, which 
required that children who enter the United States without their parents 
be granted a “general policy favoring release” to relatives or foster 
care.161 The settlement further provided that “all minors who are 
detained” must be held in “licensed” facilities, under the least restrictive 
conditions, away from unrelated adults, and given access to medical 
care, exercise, and education.162 
Judge Gee ordered DHS to promptly release the children unless it 
could demonstrate that they posed a significant flight risk or a danger to 
themselves or others.163 She gave DHS until October 23, 2015 to comply 
with the order. DHS appealed the order and also tried a new tactic of 
trying to make the family detention centers compliant with the Flores 
settlement by getting them licensed as child care facilities by the Texas 
Department of Family Protective Services. This tactic was also 
challenged in court and ultimately proved unsuccessful.164 
In December 2015, ICE launched its first large-scale community-
based alternative-to-detention program, called the Family Case 
Management Program. The word “families” generally refers to female-
headed households: women who entered the country with their 
children. The key component of this program is case management. 
According to ICE’s description of the program, each case manager will 
oversee twenty families.165 The case managers will provide a required set 
of core services, including orientation, initial intakes, education about 
 
 161 Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 
4,  2015),  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-
detention-camps.html; Roque Planas, Family Detention Centers Seek Child Care Licenses as 
Deadline Looms, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
immigrant-family-detention-texas_us_56295a93e4b0aac0b8fc58a8.  
 162 Hylton, supra note 161. 
 163 See Planas, supra note 161. 
 164 Id.; see also Nigel Duara, Hundreds of Women and Children Are Released from Texas 
Immigration Detention Facilities, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-texas-immigration-detention-release-20161204-story.html; Press Release, Human 
Rights First, Texas Judge Denies Licenses to Family Detention Facilities (Dec. 5, 2016), http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/texas-judge-denies-licenses-family-detention-facilities.  
 165 MARY F. LOISELLE, GEO WORLD, GEO CARE’S NEW FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM 3 (2016), https://www.geogroup.com/userfiles/1de79aa6-2ff2-4615-a997-786914223
7bd.pdf (“[A]n estimated 20:1 family unit to case manger ratio.”).  
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ICE check-ins, developing and updating family service plans, and 
connecting the participants with low-cost or pro bono service 
providers.166 They will also assess needs such as housing, transportation, 
medical and mental health services, religious services, ESL classes, and 
translation services in order to make appropriate referrals.167 
The Family Case Management Program is supposed to include a 
total of 1500 families across five metropolitan areas: 
Baltimore/Washington, New York, Miami, Chicago, and Los Angeles.168 
However, it has been slow to get off the ground. ICE’s Advisory 
Committee on Family Residential Centers reported in September 2016 
that the most recent data it had from ICE showed that only forty-eight 
families had been enrolled in the program.169 The Advisory Committee 
further reported that “there is so far little data on the program’s 
efficacy.”170 
The most controversial aspect of the Family Case Management 
Program has been the decision to award the $11 million contract to 
GEO Care, L.L.C., a subsidiary of GEO Group, the private, for-profit 
corporation that operates the family detention center in Karnes, 
Texas.171 Although ICE had been working with Lutheran Immigration 
and Refugee Services and the USCCB on smaller, pilot case 
management programs, it ultimately gave the contract for the Family 
Case Management Program to GEO.172 ICE expects GEO to manage the 
overall program but to subcontract with community-based 
organizations to handle the case management services.173 
The numerous human rights abuses that have occurred at Karnes, 
as well as other detention centers operated by GEO, have created a high 
level of distrust between community-based organizations and the 
private corporation, which will likely make it difficult to establish a good 
working relationship. Even if the case managers work well with GEO, 
the program may have a hard time developing trusting relationships 
with the community partners that need to be involved to provide a 
 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Michael Barajas, ICE Awards Contract to Private Prison Company that Was Just Slammed 
in Federal Report, HOUS. PRESS (Sept. 22, 2015, 12:30 PM), http://www.houstonpress.com/
news/ice-awards-contract-to-private-prison-company-that-was-just-slammed-in-federal-
report-7785696. 
 169 DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 18–19. 
 170 Id. at 19. 
 171 Barajas, supra note 168. 
 172 Jason Buch, ICE Announces Caseworker Program for Immigrant Families, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS (Sept. 17, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/ICE-
announces-caseworker-program-for-immigrant-6512150.php; Burnett, supra note 144. 
 173 Buch, supra note 172. 
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holistic range of services, including housing, medical and mental health 
care, legal aid, transportation, education, and job skills. 
A second, related concern involves the independence of the case 
managers. Presumably the case managers will have a background in 
social work, which prepares them to identify and address the needs of 
the participants, not to be responsible for immigration enforcement. 
Conflating case management and enforcement responsibilities would be 
a recipe for disaster. Case managers cannot possibly gain the trust of 
participants, which is necessary for them to perform their jobs, if they 
are also required to report noncompliance to ICE and play a role in 
enforcing removal orders. Case managers should work towards 
empowering their clients, which is antithetical to policing them. 
A third concern is that GEO has a conflict of interest because it is 
the same private corporation that operates the ISAP program and 
multiple detention centers.174 GEO profits whether or not the 
community-supervision program is successful. Participants who fail to 
follow through with the program’s requirements will likely be placed in 
either ISAP or sent back to a family detention facility, both of which 
benefit GEO financially.175 In other words, any incentive that GEO has 
to see participants in the program succeed is undercut by its incentives 
to have them fail, especially since detention is more lucrative for GEO 
than community-based supervision.176 
In addition to this conflict of interest, GEO has no experience 
providing case management services to families.177 The role that “case 
managers” play in the ISAP program is perfunctory and focuses on 
enforcement rather than prioritizing and addressing participants’ basic 
needs. GEO has never had to work closely with case managers in a 
community-based setting in the way that the Family Case Management 
Program requires. Nor has GEO previously formed close working 
relationships with community groups that provide a wide range of 
 
 174 See GEO Care, GEO, https://www.geogroup.com/GEO-Care (last visited Apr. 28, 2017); 
Our Locations, GEO, https://www.geogroup.com/Locations (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).  
 175 See THE GEO GROUP, INC., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT: PART II 5, 10, 16–17, 20–21 (2016), 
http://www.snl.com/Interactive/newlookandfeel/4144107/2016-GEO-Annual-Report.pdf.  
 176 Id. at 15–16 (showing that in 2016, Geo’s total revenue from U.S. Corrections and 
Detention activities was $1.37 billion, while its revenue from GEO Care, which handles ISAP, 
was $394 million); see also supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text (comparing the costs of 
ISAP and detention). 
 177 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Obama Administration Again 
Hands Families over to Private Prison Company (Sept. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release], 
http://aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/administration-hands-families-over-private-
prision (quoting Jeanne Atkinson, Executive Director of Catholic Legal Immigration Network, 
as saying “GEO does not have the legal or social case management expertise, nor trust of the 
immigrant community to successfully implement this program”).  
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services.178 By contrast, the two faith-based organizations that applied 
for the contract, USCCB and LIRS, have expertise developed through 
decades of experience providing legal and social case management 
services to vulnerable populations.179 
ICE could take several steps to strengthen this community-based 
case management program. First, it should adopt a model that protects 
case managers’ independence. Second, it should provide formal and 
informal mechanisms for participants, staff, and community partners to 
give feedback that is regularly reviewed and used to make improvements 
to the program’s design and operations. Third, the program should have 
a publicly available code of conduct that helps set clear expectations and 
provides ethical guidelines, including, among other things, the 
importance of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and abuse of power. 
Fourth, ICE should ensure that any supervision conditions are reviewed 
regularly to ensure that they are not excessive. Developments in a 
client’s legal case, employment situation, housing, and family situation 
can all influence decisions about what level of supervision is required. 
Fifth, ICE should ensure that systems are in place for collecting, 
analyzing, and reporting data, which should be publicly reported. This 
data should include information about compliance rates, cost, 
demographics of participants, types of services provided, number of 
cases per case manager, and number and nature of any grievances filed. 
Finally, the program should have an independent, external review 
mechanism. This review body should have access to facilities, records, 
and staff; monitor the data collected and the grievances that are filed; 
and have expertise in investigating these types of grievances. 
In other countries, community-based case management programs 
have proven to be effective alternatives to immigration detention.180 
Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Hong Kong, Thailand, 
 
 178 Id. (quoting Victor Nieblas Pradis, President of the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association, as saying “this contract should have gone to an entity with actual experience 
connecting vulnerable populations with wrap-around services in the community like housing, 
medical care, and legal services”); see also Katharina Obser, Opinion, Missing the Point: 
Alternatives to Detention to Be Run by Private Prison Contractors, NEW AM. MEDIA (Sept. 25, 
2015), http://newamericamedia.org/2015/09/missing-the-point-alternatives-to-detention-to-be-
run-by-private-prison-contractors.php (“ICE has acknowledged that it understands the unique 
experience community-based organizations bring to providing case management. But rather 
than awarding the contract to these organizations, ICE’s choice of Geo Care continues to allow 
profiting from vulnerable women and children seeking protection.”). 
 179 See Press Release, supra note 177.  
 180 See UNHCR, OPTIONS PAPER 2: OPTIONS FOR GOVERNMENTS ON OPEN RECEPTION AND 
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION 5–7 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/detention/
5538e53d9/unhcr-options-paper-2-options-governments-open-reception-alternatives-
detention.html.  
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and Indonesia have all successfully implemented such programs.181 
Compliance rates are ninety-four percent in Australia, ninety-seven 
percent in Hong Kong, ninety-seven percent in Thailand, which has a 
program that focuses specifically on unaccompanied children seeking 
refugee status, and ninety-four percent for a similar program in 
Indonesia.182 These examples show that case management is an effective 
tool to help people navigate complex immigration proceedings. By using 
detention only as a measure of last resort, the United States can help 
uphold the rights and values that attract so many millions of people to 
this country. 
III.     LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR ALTERNATIVES 
While the financial and humanitarian policy reasons for expanding 
the use of alternatives to detention are compelling, they have thus far 
not resulted in significant changes to ICE’s detention practices, despite 
the existing range of alternatives. There is therefore a need to explore 
potential legal challenges to ICE’s current detention practices. This Part 
proposes three different approaches for challenging ICE’s failure to 
adequately consider alternatives, including constitutional arguments, 
disability rights-based arguments, and international human rights 
arguments. 
A.     Constitutional Arguments 
1.     Excessive Bail 
The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required.”183 Under the Excessive Bail Clause, bail should be set no 
higher than the sum required to protect the government’s interests in 
preventing flight and danger.184 The Supreme Court has indicated that 
the Excessive Bail Clause is not limited to criminal proceedings but also 
applies in the immigration context.185 Indeed, the Excessive Bail Clause 
 
 181 INT’L DET. COAL., THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES 10–11 (2015), http://idcoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/There-Are-Alternatives-2015.pdf.  
 182 Id. at 10, 45, 52. 
 183 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 184 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Bail set at a figure higher than an amount 
reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
 185 Browning–Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263 n.3 (1989) 
(explaining that there is potential for abuse of the Bail Clause “when there is a direct 
 
MAROUF.38.6.6 (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2017  8:14 PM 
2017] ALT E RN AT I VE S  T O  D E T E N T IO N  2171 
 
 
may be particularly relevant to immigration, since the government 
requires immigration detainees to pay the full cash value of the bond to 
be released, not just provide a deposit, property, or other type of 
collateral, as in the criminal context, where even unsecured bonds are 
common.186 Since payment of a full cash bond is not required by statute, 
this is a practice that would not require congressional action to 
change.187 
While traditional challenges under the Excessive Bail Clause 
involve whether the amount of bail fixed was too high, courts have also 
applied it to the conditions of pretrial release.188 In some of these cases, 
the government conceded that the Excessive Bail Clause applies to non-
pecuniary conditions of release, such as imposition of a curfew and 
electronic monitoring.189 United States v. Salerno, one of the leading 
Supreme Court cases on the Excessive Bail Clause, explains that the 
“substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s 
proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of 
the perceived evil.”190 As a court in the Southern District of New York 
explained, the analysis in Salerno, which examined whether pretrial 
 
government restraint on personal liberty, be it in a criminal case or in a civil deportation 
proceeding”); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 531–48 (1952) (holding that denial of bail did 
not violate the Excessive Bail Clause and that, on rearrest of an alien who had been released on 
bail, a new warrant should be obtained). 
 186 SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS, supra note 3, at 30; see also MICHAEL R. JONES, 
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., UNSECURED BONDS: THE AS EFFECTIVE AND MOST EFFICIENT 
PRETRIAL RELEASE OPTION 3 (2013), http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Unsecured+
Bonds,+The+As+Effective+and+Most+Efficient+Pretrial+Release+Option+-+Jones+2013.pdf 
(explaining that studies have found unsecured bonds to be just as effective in achieving 
compliance with court appearances and safety). 
 187 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012) (referring generally to “security approved by . . . the 
Attorney General”). 
 188 See, e.g., United States v. Peeples, 630 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding 
that Adam Walsh Amendments did not violate Excessive Bail Clause as applied to the 
defendant); United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (“There may thus be 
cases where the risk of flight is so slight that any amount of bail is excessive; release on one’s 
own recognizance would then be constitutionally required, which could further limit the 
government’s discretion to fashion conditions of release.”); United States v. Cossey, 637 F. 
Supp. 2d 881 (D. Mont. 2009) (holding that Adam Walsh Amendments did not violate 
Excessive Bail Clause as applied to the defendant); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591 
(W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that the automatic imposition of curfew and electronic monitoring 
as conditions of release pursuant to the Adam Walsh Amendments violated the Excessive Bail 
Clause as applied to the defendant); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 604–06 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that an individualized determination was required regarding whether 
bail conditions, as applied to the defendant, violated his rights under the Excessive Bail Clause); 
United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1026, 1029–31 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that 
imposing electronic monitoring as a condition of pretrial release did not violate the Excessive 
Bail Clause in a case involving conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor). 
 189 Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 
 190 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987) (emphasis added) (determining 
whether pretrial detention of defendants was warranted). 
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detention violated the Eighth Amendment, “would have been entirely 
unnecessary if the Excessive Bail Clause only applied to economic 
conditions of bail.”191 
However, courts have not yet addressed the specific question of 
whether a bail requirement resulting in detention is “excessive” when 
alternatives that do not require any payment would be just as effective 
and efficient in achieving the government’s interests. Samuel R. 
Wiseman has argued that there is a need for courts to develop a 
jurisprudence of excessiveness to test the fit between the government’s 
pretrial goals (e.g., preventing flight) and the means to accomplish 
them.192 Drawing on the text, purpose, and history of the Excessive Bail 
Clause, he argues that at least an intermediate level of scrutiny should be 
applied, requiring the chosen means to be “not substantially more 
burdensome than necessary” to achieve the government’s goals.193 
Under this standard, if defendants released under electronic monitoring 
have an appearance rate at least as low as those released on bail, and the 
cost of monitoring is no greater, then concern over flight risk cannot 
justify imprisonment.194 Wiseman notes that “[t]he key to this 
constitutional argument . . . is establishing monitoring’s superior 
effectiveness.”195 Applying the same reasoning, a bond requirement 
resulting in immigration detention would be excessive if alternatives 
exist that could serve the government’s goals as well as bond at no 
greater cost. 
The concept of excessiveness in the Bail Clause reflects the 
principle of proportionality found in multiple parts of the Eighth 
Amendment, including the Excessive Fines Clause and Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.196 A nonretributive measure may be 
disproportionate because its “costs and burdens outweigh [its] likely 
benefits,” or because it is “unnecessarily costly or burdensome when 
compared to alternative means of achieving the same benefits.”197 
Failure to consider alternatives to immigration detention risks both 
types of disproportionality. 
 
 191 Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 
 192 Wiseman, supra note 51, at 1384. 
 193 Id. at 1344, 1389–95. 
 194 Id. at 1384–85. 
 195 Id. at 1384. 
 196 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison 
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 599–606 (2005). 
 197 Frase, supra note 196, at 576 (describing the former as “ends disproportionality” and the 
latter as “means disproportionality”). 
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2.     Procedural Due Process 
Failure to consider alternatives to detention also implicates due 
process. Freedom from detention, including immigration detention, 
“lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment Due Process] 
Clause protects.”198 The Supreme Court has therefore found that 
immigration detention must “bear[][a] reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual [was] committed.”199 The purpose of 
immigration detention is to prevent flight and danger to the 
community.200 Failure to consider alternatives to detention can result in 
the detention of noncitizens for reasons totally unrelated to flight or 
danger, such as inability to pay a bond. Detention without consideration 
of alternatives therefore may not always be reasonably related to the 
government’s legitimate purposes in preventing flight and danger.201 
This is particularly true in civil proceedings, including removal 
proceedings, where the individual interests at stake are more substantial 
than mere loss of money and “due process places a heightened burden 
of proof on the State.”202 
At the heart of the traditional three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge 
for procedural due process is the concept of proportionality.203 This test 
requires “comparing the marginal benefits gained by added procedural 
safeguards with the added cost and administrative burdens of those 
 
 198 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (recognizing 
the fundamental nature of pretrial liberty). 
 199 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)); see also Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1077 (9th Cir. 
2015) (requiring the government to establish that it has “a legitimate interest reasonably related 
to continued [immigration] detention”); Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(establishing procedural safeguards for immigration bond determination hearings “to ensure 
that the government’s asserted justification for physical confinement ‘outweighs the 
individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint’” (quoting Casas-
Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
 200 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1) (2016); Guerra, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006); Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1102 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 201 See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (“Only if the sentencing court 
determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet 
the State’s interest in punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who has 
made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 
1978) (en banc) (“The incarceration of those who cannot [pay bond], without meaningful 
consideration of other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection 
requirements.”); Williams v. Farrior, 626 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (“[I]t is clear that a 
bail system which allows only monetary bail and does not provide for any meaningful 
consideration of other possible alternatives for indigent pretrial detainees infringes on both 
equal protection and due process requirements.”). 
 202 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996); see also Singh, 638 F.3d at 1204 (quoting 
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 363). 
 203 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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safeguards.”204 Under the first prong of the Mathews test, a court 
considers the private interest at stake, which, here, is freedom from 
physical detention. The Court has long held that “[f]reedom from bodily 
restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”205 Indeed, even in 
the context of the war on terror and individuals accused of being 
“enemy combatants,” the Court has stressed that the deprivation of 
liberty associated with physical detention must be given great weight on 
the Mathews scale.206 
Under the second prong of the test, courts consider the 
government’s interest, which is to prevent flight and protect the 
community’s safety. Third, courts consider the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of the private interest at stake. Failing to consider 
alternatives to detention creates a substantial risk of erroneous 
deprivation of liberty. The range of alternatives to detention discussed 
above is often sufficient to protect the government’s legitimate interests 
in preventing flight and protecting safety.207 While the government is 
not required to use the least burdensome means of securing noncitizens, 
using detention as the default, rather than as a last resort, creates an 
enormous risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty.208 
3.     Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
federal government from “invidiously den[ying] one class of defendants 
a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants.”209 Failure 
to consider alternatives to detention other than posting a bond, as well 
as failure to take an individual’s ability to pay into account when setting 
a bond, disproportionately results in the detention of indigent persons. 
Although indigent individuals are not normally a suspect class entitled 
to heightened scrutiny, the Supreme Court has applied heightened 
scrutiny in situations where indigent individuals are “completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an 
 
 204 Frase, supra note 196, at 611. 
 205 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
 206 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–31 (2004). 
 207 See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). 
 208 See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the 
court’s injunction “merely directs [Immigration Judges] to ‘consider’ restrictions short of 
detention” and “does not require that IJs apply the least restrictive means of supervision”). 
 209 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). 
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absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that 
benefit.”210 
Applying this rationale, the Court has invalided state laws that 
prevent an indigent criminal defendant from acquiring a transcript or 
an adequate substitute for a transcript to use during trial.211 The Court 
found that the payment requirements amounted to de facto 
discrimination against those who were totally unable to pay for the 
transcripts, for “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a 
man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”212 Similarly, in 
holding that an indigent defendant has a right to counsel on appeal, the 
Court found that “an unconstitutional line ha[d] been drawn between 
rich and the poor,” since an indigent individual without counsel only 
received a “meaningless ritual, while the rich man ha[d] a meaningful 
appeal.”213 Likewise, a bond redetermination hearing is only a 
meaningless ritual if indigent individuals who are totally unable to pay 
for a bond remain detained even if a bond is granted, while wealthier 
individuals obtain their freedom. 
Furthermore, in cases where fundamental rights are involved, the 
Court has been more willing to look closely at distinctions on the basis 
of wealth. For example, the Court has struck down state statutes 
requiring payment of filing fees in divorce cases because of the 
fundamental nature of the marital relationship.214 The Court has also 
struck down state laws that required payment of filing fees to submit a 
writ of habeas corpus, finding that failure to extend the “the highest 
safeguard of liberty” to indigent prisoners violated equal protection.215 
Physical liberty is, of course, also what is at stake in the context of 
immigration detention, and the Court has “always been careful not to 
‘minimize the importance and fundamental nature’ of the individual’s 
right to liberty.”216 
Of direct relevance to the present argument is the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Pugh v. Rainwater, which applied heightened scrutiny to an 
equal protection claim challenging a State’s refusal to consider a 
defendant’s inability to pay in setting bail.217 There, the court reasoned 
 
 210 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1973). But see Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing 
alone is not a suspect classification.”). 
 211 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 (1956). 
 212 Id. at 19. 
 213 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963). 
 214 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971). 
 215 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961). 
 216 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 750 (1987)). 
 217 Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1055–56 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 
399 U.S. 235 (1970)); see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 
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that “imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious 
discrimination and not constitutionally permissible.”218 A number of 
federal district courts and state courts have likewise held that failure to 
consider alternatives to bail for pretrial detainees violates equal 
protection by impermissibly discriminating against indigent 
individuals.219 
Even if only rational basis applies, rather than heightened scrutiny, 
one could argue that the failure to consider alternatives to detention is 
not rationally related to the government’s legitimate interests in 
preventing flight and protecting the public.220 This argument would 
require showing that alternatives to detention are highly effective at 
achieving the government’s interests and do not impose a greater 
financial or administrative burden. The evidence, discussed in Part II 
above, suggests that this is, in fact, the case for at least some of the 
alternatives to detention. Additional data regarding the short- and long-
term costs involved in establishing and administering various types of 
alternative-to-detention programs would be extremely useful in 
supporting this type of equal protection challenge.221 
 
 218 Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1056. 
 219 See, e.g., Williams v. Farrior, 626 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (“For purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, it is clear that a bail system which 
allows only monetary bail and does not provide for any meaningful consideration of other 
possible alternatives for indigent pretrial detainees infringes on both equal protection and due 
process requirements.”); Alabama v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959, 968 (Ala. 1994) (“Under the scheme 
established by the Act, a defendant with financial means . . . can obtain immediate release 
simply by posting bail. However, an indigent defendant charged with a relatively minor 
misdemeanor who cannot obtain release by cash bail, a bail bond, or property bail, must remain 
incarcerated for a minimum of three days, and perhaps longer, before being able to obtain 
judicial public bail. We conclude that, as written, article VII of the Act violates an indigent 
defendant’s equal protection rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution . . . .”); Lee v. 
Lawson, 375 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Miss. 1979) (“A consideration of the equal protection and due 
process rights of indigent pretrial detainees leads us to the inescapable conclusion that a bail 
system based on monetary bail alone would be unconstitutional.”). 
 220 But see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 268–70 (1973) (rejecting an equal protection 
challenge to a New York statute that denied certain state prisoners good-time credit for parole 
eligibility for the period of their presentence county jail incarceration, but granted the full 
allowance of good-time credit for the entire period of their prison confinement to those 
released on bail prior to their sentence). 
 221 See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 682–87 (2012) (holding that 
administrative convenience provided a rational basis for the city’s unequal treatment of sewer 
customers); FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (holding that plausible 
policy reason for the classification exists if “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis for the classification”). Armour, however, involved a tax 
statute, where especially broad latitude in creating distinctions is allowed. Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). 
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4.     Substantive Due Process 
Failure to consider alternatives to detention may also give rise to a 
substantive due process challenge to the conditions of immigration 
detention. In the criminal context, claims regarding the conditions of 
detention are governed by either the Fourth Amendment or the Eighth 
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that seizures must 
be “reasonable” begins at the time of arrest, but it is not clear when this 
requirement ends.222 When arrests occur without a warrant, circuit 
courts are split regarding whether the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness standard extends until there is a judicial determination 
of probable cause.223 
In the immigration context, which involves nonpunitive civil 
detention, the conditions of detention are governed by substantive due 
process under the Fifth Amendment after the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections end. The line demarking when the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections end and substantive due process protections begin, however, 
is even murkier than in the criminal context, since arrests are typically 
made without warrants and there is no judicial review of probable 
cause.224 One could argue that without any judicial determination of 
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard should 
govern the entire period of immigration detention. Courts, however, 
have not applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner; instead, they 
have applied substantive due process protections to the conditions of 
immigration detention. 
The substantive due process standard for conditions of 
nonpunitive pretrial detention derives from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bell v. Wolfish, which requires a court to determine whether 
the conditions are imposed for the purpose of punishment. Wolfish 
explained that “if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a 
legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly 
may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment 
that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua 
 
 222 See Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 
1019 (2013). 
 223 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have found that the reasonableness standard applies until 
there is a judicial determination of probable cause, while the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have 
rejected this view. Meanwhile, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have applied the reasonableness 
standard to certain types of claims arising before a judicial determination of probable cause but 
an Eighth Amendment “subjective deliberate indifference” standard to other types of claims 
arising during the same period. Id. at 1019–22. 
 224 See Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 125, 161–63 (2015) (discussing constitutional concerns arising from the absence of a 
neutral review for probable cause in immigration enforcement). 
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detainees.”225 In other words, a court must decide whether a restriction 
or condition “appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
[nonpunitive] purpose assigned [to it].”226 
Based on Wolfish, some courts have held that pretrial detainees are 
entitled to “reasonable” care,227 while other courts apply the “deliberate 
indifference” standard derived from Eighth Amendment cases regarding 
cruel and unusual punishment.228 The Supreme Court has never 
clarified whether nonpunitive, pretrial detainees receive greater 
protections under substantive due process than convicted prisoners 
receive under the Eighth Amendment. However, the emphasis on 
reasonableness in Wolfish is consistent with Supreme Court cases 
holding that the conditions of nonpunitive civil commitment must 
“bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual 
is committed.”229 Since immigration detainees are both civil detainees 
and pre-adjudication detainees, they should be entitled to protections at 
least as great as afforded to civilly committed individuals and pretrial 
defendants.230 
Building on the implied principle of proportionality, the Court in 
Wolfish addressed consideration of less harsh alternatives in a footnote, 
explaining: 
[L]oading a detainee with chains and shackles and throwing him in a 
dungeon may ensure his presence at trial and preserve the security of 
the institution. But it would be difficult to conceive of a situation 
where conditions so harsh, employed to achieve objectives that could 
be accomplished in so many alternative and less harsh methods, 
 
 225 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). 
 226 Id. at 538 (second alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 169 (1963)). 
 227 See, e.g., Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1992); Cupit v. Jones, 
835 F.2d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[P]retrial detainees are entitled to reasonable medical care 
unless the failure to supply that care is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 
objective.”); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1043–44 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 228 As Catherine T. Struve has explained, “[t]he trend is toward applying the Eighth 
Amendment subjective deliberate indifference standard” to claims of denial of medical care, 
failure to prevent suicide, and failure to protect from attack, whereas courts are “relatively 
evenly divided” between the deliberate indifference standard and the test in Wolfish for claims 
relating to general conditions of confinement; and there is “at least a three-way split in the case 
law” with respect to excessive force claims. Struve, supra note 222, at 1024. Struve proposes “an 
intermediate ground between objective reasonableness and subjective deliberate indifference,” 
which is “in essence, the objective deliberate indifference test.” Id. at 1067–68. 
 229 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
324 (1982) (holding that a civilly committed individual has a substantive due process right to 
“conditions of reasonable care and safety” and “reasonably nonrestrictive confinement 
conditions”). 
 230 See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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would not support a conclusion that the purpose for which they were 
imposed was to punish.231 
In a subsequent case quoting this language, the Court confirmed that “a 
failure to consider, or to use, ‘alternative and less harsh methods’ to 
achieve a nonpunitive objective can help to show that legislature’s 
‘purpose . . . was to punish.’”232 
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the language in Wolfish 
regarding consideration of less harsh alternatives as another way to 
understand the rule that restrictions should not be excessive in relation 
to their purpose.233 The court found that incarcerating someone for six 
days because she refused to submit to booking procedures was excessive 
under the standard in Wolfish, given the alternatives available, which 
included booking over the defendant’s objections, requesting a booking 
order, and partial booking.234 Thus, similar to the analysis under the 
Excessive Bail Clause, failure to consider less harsh alternatives to 
immigration detention may result in the imposition of restrictions or 
conditions that are excessive and disproportionate in relation to the 
government’s purpose of preventing flight and danger.235 In the criminal 
context, courts have ordered anti-incarcerative planning and programs 
as remedies in litigation involving constitutional challenges to detention 
conditions.236 Along the same lines, courts could order DHS to develop 
and use alternatives to detention in litigation challenging immigration 
detention conditions. 
B.     Disability Rights Arguments 
Disability rights statutes provide another avenue for challenging 
ICE’s failure to consider and use alternatives to immigration detention. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination 
based on a disability by “public entities,” including an “instrumentality 
of a State.”237 Its precursor, the Rehabilitation Act (RA), prohibits 
disability-based discrimination in programs and activities that receive 
 
 231 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20 (emphasis added). 
 232 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 388 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Wolfish, 
441 U.S. at 539 n.20). 
 233 Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1484–85 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 234 Id. 
 235 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”). 
 236 See generally Margo Schlanger, Anti-Incarcerative Remedies for Illegal Conditions of 
Confinement, 6 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 237 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination by a “public entity”); id. § 12131(1) 
(defining “public entity” as including an “instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government”). 
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“Federal financial assistance” or are “conducted by any Executive 
Agency.”238 The trickiness in applying these two statutes in the context 
of immigration is the use of three different types of facilities: those 
operated by ICE, state and local jails, and private prison companies.  
The ADA applies to state and local governments, but not to the 
federal government, because it has not waived its immunity. However, 
as an executive agency, DHS can be sued under the Rehabilitation Act 
for violations that occur in all three types of immigration detention 
facilities. In fact, DHS has issued regulations implementing the 
Rehabilitation Act.239 These regulations specifically provide that DHS 
cannot avoid responsibility under the Rehabilitation Act by 
“contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.”240 Therefore, despite 
DHS’s contracts with state and local jails, as well as private prison 
companies, it remains liable for violations of the Rehabilitation Act that 
occur in those facilities. Federal appellate court decisions confirm that 
the federal government is liable to ensure that their contractors comply 
with the Rehabilitation Act.241  
State and local jails that contract with DHS, on the other hand, can 
be sued under Title II of the ADA, because they “fall squarely within the 
statutory definition of ‘public entity.’”242 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has found that state prisons satisfy the ADA’s requirement to 
provide the “benefits” of “programs, services, or activities.” The Court 
has explained that “[m]odern prisons provide inmates with many 
recreational ‘activities,’ medical ‘services,’ and educational and 
vocational ‘programs,’ all of which at least theoretically ‘benefit’ the 
 
 238 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). Although this Section focuses 
on the ADA and RA, challenges to immigration detention practices may also be brought under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012), based 
on failure to provide appropriate special education services to children held in “Family 
Residential Centers.” See DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 65–67. 
 239 6 C.F.R. §§ 15.1–15.70 (2017). 
 240 Id. § 15.30(b)(1); see also id. § 15.50 (stating that DHS generally “shall operate each 
program or activity so that the program or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with a disability” (emphasis added)); id. § 15.49 (“Except 
as otherwise provided in § 15.50, no qualified individual with a disability shall, because the 
Department’s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with a disability, be denied 
the benefits of, be excluded from participation in, or otherwise be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity conducted by the Department.” (emphasis added)). 
 241 See, e.g., Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Defendants are 
obligated to ensure that Eurofresh—like all other State contractors—complies with federal laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.”); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 
261, 286 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The common law of contracts strongly suggests that the state 
defendant is liable to ensure that localities comply with the Rehabilitation Act in their delivery 
of federally-funded social services.”). 
 242 Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210–12 (1998) (holding that Title II of the 
ADA, prohibiting “public entity” from discriminating against “qualified individual with a 
disability” on account of that individual’s disability, applied to inmates in state prisons). 
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prisoners (and any of which disabled prisoners could be ‘excluded from 
participation in’).”243 
The more difficult question is whether the private prison 
companies that operate immigration detention facilities can be held 
liable for violations of either the RA or the ADA. The issue under the 
RA is whether a private prison company receives “federal financial 
assistance.”244 Several circuit courts have held that purely compensatory 
payments to private companies at fair market value do not constitute 
“federal financial assistance”; but if the federal government intends to 
give a subsidy to the company, rather than just compensate them, that 
could constitute “federal financial assistance.”245 The challenge, 
therefore, would be in establishing that the government subsidizes—and 
intends to subsidize—the private prison companies that hold 
immigration detainees. At a minimum, courts should permit discovery 
to obtain evidence that would help show the government’s intent to 
subsidize the company.246 
Alternatively, one could try to hold private prison companies liable 
under the ADA by arguing that: (1) the private prison company is a 
“public entity” as an “instrumentality of a State” under Title II of the 
ADA;247 or (2) the detention facility operated by the private prison 
company is a “place of public accommodation” under Title III of the 
ADA.248 At the time of this writing, no courts have held that a private 
prison company can be a “public entity” under Title II. However, in a 
dissenting opinion, Judge Rosemary Barkett on the Eleventh Circuit 
backed the “instrumentality of the State” theory, explaining that “when a 
company takes the place of the state in performing a function within the 
exclusive province of the state, that company cannot be permitted to 
avoid the requirements of the law governing that state function.”249 The 
majority, on the other hand, found that the private prison company, 
 
 243 Id. at 210. 
 244 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(a) (2016) (“No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of 
handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity which receives Federal financial 
assistance.”); id. § 104.3(h) (defining “federal financial assistance”). 
 245 See Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 420 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005); DeVargas v. Mason 
& Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1382 (10th Cir. 1990); Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 
Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. Venkatraman v. REI Systems, Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 
421 (4th Cir. 2005) (reaching the same conclusion in discussing contractor liability under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 246 Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1147 (D. Colo. 2000) (“Shepherd 
should be allowed the benefit of discovery, particularly with reference to the issue of whether 
Congress or any federal agency, by providing direct or indirect financial assistance to USOC, 
has or had the requisite intent to subsidize it.”).  
 247 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B) (2012). 
 248 Id. § 12182(a). 
 249 Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010) (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
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GEO Care Group, Inc., could not be held liable under Title II, reasoning 
that “a private corporation is not a public entity merely because it 
contracts with a public entity to provide some service.”250 Other courts 
have reached the same conclusion.251 
With respect to the argument that a detention facility operated by a 
private company qualifies as a “place of public accommodation” under 
Title III of the ADA, this would also likely be an uphill battle due to lack 
of precedent. The ADA lists twelve types of facilities that qualify as 
“public accommodations” and does not include prisons.252 However, the 
list includes a “place of lodging,” as well as services that are provided by 
private prisons, such as service of “food or drink,” as well as health care 
services.253 A private prison company that directly provides these 
services could potentially be held liable under Title III. At least one 
district court has found that “it is reasonable to consider a jail a public 
place in the context of inmates’ rights to be free from discrimination on 
the basis of their disabilities.”254 There, the court analogized jails to 
schools and hospitals, which restrict public access but are nevertheless 
considered “public accommodations.”255 Other courts have also found 
that highly restricted areas can be public accommodations, even though 
they are not open to the general public.256  
Thus, while legal theories exist for holding a private prison 
company liable under the RA and ADA, there is currently little support 
for these theories by way of precedent. However, DHS can be sued 
under the RA for violations committed by its private contractors, and 
 
 250 Id. at 1310 (majority opinion). 
 251 See, e.g., Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that a 
private hospital performing services pursuant to a contract with a municipality was not an 
instrumentality of the government, and thus not a public entity under the ADA); Lee v. Corr. 
Corp. of Am./Corr. Treatment Facility, 61 F. Supp. 3d 139, 143 (D.D.C. 2014) (“As a private 
prison company, defendant is not covered by Title II of the ADA.”); Cox v. Jackson, 579 F. 
Supp. 2d 831, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that a private company providing medical 
services to a prison is not a public entity).  
 252 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). 
 253 Id. § 12181(7)(A), (B), (F); see also Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F. Supp. 3d 963 
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that a private provider of jail medical services operated a place of 
public accommodation for purposes of Title III of the ADA). 
 254 Wilkins-Jones v. County of Alameda, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 255 Id. 
 256 See, e.g., Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he fact that 
users of a facility are highly selected does not mean that the facility cannot be a public 
accommodation.”); Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the denial of hospital staff privileges to a physician can be challenged under Title 
III of the ADA, even though the case involved parts of the hospital that are not open to the 
general public); Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 759 (D. Or. 1997) 
(holding that an arena’s executive suites contracted by businesses are public accommodations); 
Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D. Ariz. 1992) (undisputed that 
Title III applies to access to coaches’ box on baseball field).  
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state and local jails can be sued under the ADA as public entities. The 
RA and ADA claims discussed below therefore are directed primarily at 
DHS and state and local jails. 
Under both the RA and the ADA, the plaintiff bears the initial 
burden of establishing the elements of the prima facie case, which 
requires showing that: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; 
(2) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the 
benefits of a public entity’s services, programs or activities, or was 
otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such 
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the 
plaintiff’s disability.257 The burden then shifts to the public entity to 
show that the requested accommodation or modification would require 
a fundamental alteration or produce an undue financial and 
administrative burden.258 
A qualified disability is broadly defined as “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”259 
The second element is usually easy to satisfy in the context of 
correctional facilities, since the Supreme Court has recognized that 
almost any activity in which inmates participate is controlled by jail 
staff, making it a public service, activity, or program.260 The third 
element, which requires showing discrimination on the basis of a 
disability, can be shown in various ways. The denial of equal access to 
services, as well as using administrative methods that have the effect of 
discrimination, constitute discrimination.261 The RA does not explicitly 
recognize “institutionalization” and “segregation” as forms of 
discrimination like the ADA.262 However, the regulations implementing 
 
 257 See, e.g., Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 258 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (2016). 
 259 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). The determination of whether an impairment 
“substantially limits a major life activity” is made “without regard to the ameliorative effects of 
mitigating measures such as medication . . . or . . . learned behavioral or adaptive neurological 
modifications.” Id. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)–(IV). 
 260 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210–11; see also Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 
929, 935–36 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[M]ost everything provided to inmates is a public service, 
program or activity, including sleeping, eating, showering, toileting, communicating with those 
outside the jail by mail and telephone, exercising, entertainment, safety and security, the jail’s 
administrative, disciplinary, and classification proceedings, medical, mental health and dental 
services, the library, educational, vocational, substance abuse and anger management classes 
and discharge services.”). 
 261 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i)–(ii), b(3)(i); see also McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 
1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that when a public entity’s uniformly enforced policy or 
program places a greater burden on a disabled person than non-disabled persons, and the entity 
fails to reasonably accommodate the disability, the entity discriminates against the disabled 
person “by reason of” his disability). 
 262 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (ADA); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 
581, 600 (1999). 
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the RA do require programs, services, and activities to be administered 
in “the most integrated setting appropriate” to the needs of individuals 
with disabilities, just like the ADA.263 In addition, both statutes require 
public entities to make reasonable modifications when necessary to 
avoid discrimination.264 
Applying this framework, courts have found valid RA and ADA 
claims based on a variety of deficiencies in correctional centers. These 
include denial of medical and psychiatric care to pretrial detainees and 
inmates;265 failure to reasonably accommodate mobility-impaired and 
dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees within the detention center;266 
failure to provide appropriate transportation to wheelchair-bound 
arrestee;267 failure to provide immediate access to prescribed HIV 
medications;268 failure to offer exercise, religious services, classes, and 
meetings in a location accessible to inmates who cannot climb stairs;269 
and failure to furnish sign language interpreters to inmates.270 
 
 263 Compare 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (RA), with id. § 35.130(d) (ADA). 
 264 Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(7)(i). 
 265 See, e.g., Winters v. Ark. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 491 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 
2007) (finding that the failure to provide “reasonable medical care” to a pretrial detainee on the 
basis of disability can constitute discrimination under the ADA and RA); Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t 
of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 284 (1st Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that “[m]edical care is one of the 
‘services, programs, or activities’ covered by the ADA” but noting that courts have 
“differentiated ADA claims based on negligent medical care from those based on 
discriminatory medical care”); Cleveland v. Gautreaux, 198 F. Supp. 3d 717 (M.D. La. 2016) 
(holding that plaintiff stated a valid ADA claim based on failure to provide treatment for 
mental disabilities, as well as denial of a wheelchair), appeal dismissed, No. 16-30926 (5th Cir. 
Oct. 26, 2016); Anderson v. County of Siskiyou, No. C 10–01428 SBA, 2010 WL 3619821 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (holding that failure to provide access to psychiatric care and treatment to a 
pretrial detainee who had been found incompetent to stand trial and committed suicide in 
county jail violated the ADA); Hughes v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1241–42 
(D. Colo. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations regarding outright denial of medical 
treatment for his mental disability was sufficient to state a claim under the ADA); see also 
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006) (stating, in dictum, that “it is quite plausible 
that the alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate . . . disability-related needs 
in such fundamentals as . . . medical care” constitutes exclusion from or denial of the benefits of 
the prison’s services, programs, or activities under the ADA (emphasis added)); Yeskey, 524 
U.S. at 210 (expressly noting that the phrase “services, programs, or activities of a public entity” 
in 42 U.S.C. § 12132 encompasses medical services offered in prisons); cf. Simmons v. Navajo 
County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the mere provision of inadequate 
medical care does not state a claim under the ADA); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (same). 
 266 See, e.g., Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 267 See, e.g., Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Gorman’s allegations that 
the defendants denied him the benefit of post-arrest transportation appropriate in light of his 
disability fall within the framework of both Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act.”). 
 268 See, e.g., McNally v. Prison Health Servs., 46 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58–59 (D. Me. 1999). 
 269 See, e.g., Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(finding significant evidence of ADA violations based on failure to provide exercise, religious 
services, classes, and Narcotics and Alcoholic Anonymous meetings to inmates who could not 
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Many of the same types of deficiencies have been documented in 
immigration detention centers. For example, human rights 
organizations have documented numerous cases of denial of life-saving 
HIV/AIDS medications in immigration detention facilities.271 In 
addition, ICE’s Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers has 
reported that ICE lacks policies, standard operating procedures, and 
strategies for complying with the RA with respect to communications-
related disabilities, such as sight-impairments, hearing-impairments, 
and speech-impairments.272 Furthermore, reports indicate that ICE 
often places individuals with mental disabilities in administrative 
segregation and solitary confinement simply because jail staff are 
unwilling to deal with their unique circumstances.273 
Placing detainees with physical and mental disabilities in 
alternative-to-detention programs would help avoid liability under the 
RA. If a detention facility is inaccessible to individuals with disabilities, 
or cannot provide cells that are safe and appropriate for individuals with 
disabilities, placement in an alternative program could constitute the 
simplest and most cost-effective form of a reasonable accommodation 
or modification. 
In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the seminal Supreme Court 
case prohibiting the unnecessary isolation of persons with mental 
disabilities, the Court required community-based services, as long as the 
person’s treatment professionals determine that community services are 
appropriate, the person does not object to living in the community, and 
the provision of services in the community would be a reasonable 
accommodation.274 Citing Olmstead, the Seventh Circuit has remarked 
 
climb stairs, as well as failure to provide inmates with sign language interpreters). 
 270 See, e.g., id. 
 271 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHRONIC INDIFFERENCE: HIV/AIDS SERVICES FOR 
IMMIGRANTS DETAINED BY THE UNITED STATES (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/us1207web.pdf; BRIAN STAUFFER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “DO YOU SEE HOW MUCH 
I’M SUFFERING HERE?”: ABUSE AGAINST TRANSGENDER WOMEN IN US IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0316_web.pdf 
(documenting cases of transgender detainees who were not given access to HIV medications for 
two to three months after entering detention); HIV/AIDS Services for Immigrants Detained by 
the United States: Human Rights Watch submission to the House Judiciary Committee 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and International Law, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 1, 2008, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/06/01/hiv/aids-
services-immigrants-detained-united-states. 
 272 See DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 80–81.  
 273 INVISIBLE IN ISOLATION, supra note 59, at 9; INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 118 (2010), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/docs/pdf/migrants2011.pdf (“[T]he Inter-American 
Commission is deeply troubled by the use of confinement (‘administrative segregation’ or 
‘disciplinary segregation’) in the case of vulnerable immigration detainees, 
including . . . mentally challenged detainees.” (footnote omitted)). 
 274 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597–601 (1999). 
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that “[t]o be ‘institutionalized,’ whether in a prison, a madhouse, or a 
‘state-operated developmental center,’ is to be frozen out of society.”275 
In order to avoid liability under Olmstead, public entities must 
demonstrate that integrated community services would be too costly. 
An effective plan for achieving community integration of people with 
disabilities demonstrates compliance with the ADA. Although the 
integration mandate of the ADA does not apply federal immigration 
detention centers, the identical mandate of the RA does. By analogy, 
then, Olmstead’s reasoning should apply in this context. Under 
Olmstead and its progeny, keeping individuals with disabilities 
institutionalized in a detention center when equally effective and less 
expensive options are available may be difficult to justify. While the 
government may try to argue that alternative placements require a 
“fundamental alteration,” courts have found that “transfer of services to 
existing community settings is not, by itself, a ‘fundamental 
alteration.’”276 Since ICE already has existing alternatives to detention, 
no fundamental alteration should be necessary. 
The government would also likely argue that placing immigration 
detainees with disabilities in community-based alternatives imposes 
undue hardship. Although the government’s own data indicate that the 
per person cost of alternative-to-detention programs are far cheaper 
than detention, that comparison may not be enough to defeat the 
hardship argument.277 Olmstead noted that courts may not simply 
compare the cost of institutionalization against the cost of community-
based health services because that comparison does not take into 
account the State’s financial obligation to continue operating partially 
full institutions with fixed overhead costs.278 The Court in Olmstead was 
concerned about taking resources from other institutionalized mental 
health patients in order to provide immediate relief to the plaintiffs. In 
the immigration detention context, shifting funding from detention to 
 
 275 Ill. League of Advocates for the Developmentally Disabled v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
803 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 276 Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(emphasis added); see also Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Olmstead 
did not regard the transfer of services to a community setting, without more, as a fundamental 
alteration.”). 
 277 Olmstead lists several factors that are relevant to the fundamental-alteration defense, 
including the State’s ability to continue meeting the needs of other institutionalized mental 
health patients for whom community placement is not appropriate, whether the State has a 
waiting list for community placements, and whether the State has developed a comprehensive 
plan to move eligible patients into community care settings. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605–06. 
 278 Id. at 604 n.15; see also id. at 612–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that states have 
considerable latitude in analyzing the “comparative costs of treatment” and cautioning courts 
against intervening in “political” decisions about the allocation of funds). 
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alternatives may also have a negative impact on individuals with 
disabilities who remain detained. 
There are at least two responses to this argument. First, some 
courts have held that, under Olmstead, a public entity should, at a 
minimum, have a working plan for placing persons with mental 
disabilities in less restrictive settings, as well as a waiting list that moves 
at a reasonable pace and is not controlled by endeavors to keep 
institutions fully populated.279 ICE and its contractual partners have 
presented no such plan, or any kind of waiting list for alternative-to-
detention programs. This is, therefore, not a situation where a court 
would have to “order displacement of persons at the top of the 
community-based treatment waiting list by individuals lower down who 
commenced civil actions.”280 Second, there is evidence that ICE’s 
custody determinations are, in fact, driven by the availability of bed 
space in detention centers.281 
In situations where immigration detainees are kept in solitary 
confinement or administrative isolation due to a mental disability, 
Olmstead is particularly relevant. Litigation in Colorado, for example, 
has challenged the administrative segregation of prisoners with mental 
disabilities under the ADA.282 In 2014, the Department of Justice issued 
 
 279 See id. at 605–06 (majority opinion); see also Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374, 382 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing “the minimal burden of 
demonstrating ‘that there will be ongoing progress toward community placement’ under the 
general plan” and stating that “[w]ithout such a preliminary showing, an agency cannot 
establish a fundamental alteration defense” (quoting Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 364 
F.3d 487, 500 (3d Cir. 2004))); see also Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve P. Calandrillo, Forward to 
Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA Title II Integration Lawsuits After Olmstead v. L.C., 
24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 724 (2001) (“[I]f . . . plaintiffs satisfy eligibility criteria for an 
existing community treatment plan, but have not been transferred due to error, administrative 
convenience, or a lack of available slots, then a court is less likely to deem a required transfer to 
be a fundamental alteration based on administrative discretion as an essential feature.”). 
 280 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606. 
 281 See, e.g., CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 109, at 62 (finding that the McAllen Border Patrol 
station tracks family detention bed space and releases families with bus tickets and Notices to 
Appear if there are no beds available); DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 4 (stating that 
decisions appear to be “largely dependent on whether there is available bed space in [Family 
Residential Centers]”); IACHR 2015 REPORT, supra note 109, at 70 (concluding that, but for 
capacity limitations, all families would be detained under current policy); LUTHERAN 
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE SERV. (LIRS) & THE WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N (WRC), LOCKING 
UP FAMILY VALUES, AGAIN 6 (2014), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LIRSWRC_
LockingUpFamilyValuesAgain_Report_141114.pdf (“DHS officials have stated that there is no 
set standard or policy to determine which families are detained and which families are released 
except for the availability of bed space.”). 
 282 See generally Brittany Glidden & Laura Rovner, Requiring the State to Justify Supermax 
Confinement for Mentally Ill Prisoners: A Disability Discrimination Approach, 90 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 55 (2012); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth 
Amendment Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a 
Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012). 
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a Findings Letter charging the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
with violating the ADA through its policies and practices of 
unnecessarily segregating prisoners with disabilities.283 Commentators 
have noted that this action by the Department of Justice has opened the 
door to further litigation challenging the use of solitary confinement 
under the ADA.284 In fact, New York and Texas have already started 
scaling back the use of solitary confinement under the pressure of 
lawsuits and concerns about isolation’s impact on individuals with 
mental disabilities.285 
In considering disability rights-based challenges to immigration 
detention practices, it is crucial to remember that immigration 
detention is supposed to be nonpunitive and, therefore, should be based 
on civil, rather than criminal, principles.286 This is why deterrence is not 
a legitimate reason for immigration detention.287 As ICE’s Advisory 
Committee on Family Residential Centers has explained, integration 
into the community would allow immigrant families, many of whom 
have experienced enormous psychological trauma, to “remain intact” 
and “maximize [their] opportunity to function as pro-social and 
productive members of the community.”288 
 
 283 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, & David 
J. Hickton, U.S. Attorney, to Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa., Investigation of the State 
Correctional Institution at Cresson and Notice of Expanded Investigation (May 31, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/06/03/cresson_findings_5-31-13.pdf; 
Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, & David J. 
Hickton, U.S. Attorney, to Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa., Investigation of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections’ Use of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners with Serious Mental 
Illness and/or Intellectual Disability (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
crt/legacy/2014/02/25/pdoc_finding_2-24-14.pdf. 
 284 See, e.g., Elizabeth Alexander, “This Experiment, So Fatal”: Some Initial Thoughts on 
Strategic Choices in the Campaign Against Solitary Confinement, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 37–39 
(2015); Ian M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary: Litigating an End to the Solitary Confinement of 
Children in Jails and Prisons, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675, 703–04 (2016); Ariel A. 
Simms, Solitary Confinement in America: Time for Change and a Proposed Model of Reform, 19 
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 239, 254–55 (2016); Jessica Knowles, Note and Comment, “The 
Shameful Wall of Exclusion”: How Solitary Confinement for Inmates with Mental Illness Violates 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 90 WASH. L. REV. 893, 928–30 (2015). 
 285 Anita Kumar, Critics of Va. Supermax Prison Doubt Isolation Is the Solution, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 8, 2012, at A1. 
 286 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532–33 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that 
immigration detention is permissible only “to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of 
flight or dangerousness”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 287 See R.I.L.-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015) (enjoining DHS from using 
deterrence as a factor in initial custody determinations and in arguments against release of 
families on bond); Press Release, Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Statement on Family 
Residential Centers (June 24, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/24/statement-
secretary-jeh-c-johnson-family-residential-centers (announcing that DHS had “discontinued 
invoking general deterrence as a factor in custody determinations in all cases involving 
families”). 
 288 DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 23. 
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Just as the Court in Olmstead reasoned that “institutional 
placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community 
settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated 
are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life,” so, too, 
does institutional placement of civil immigration detainees cause 
unnecessary stigma and suffering.289 The explosion of interest in 
providing trauma-informed services to immigrants reflects the 
increasing awareness of past experiences of violence and trauma among 
this population, as well as an expanding body of research demonstrating 
the physical and behavioral impact of such trauma.290 Detention 
compounds this trauma, and its cumulative effect can be psychologically 
and physically devastating.291 Confinement of immigration detainees 
also “severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, 
including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic 
independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment,” as 
the Court stated in Olmstead.292 
C.     International Human Rights Arguments 
Failure to consider alternatives to immigration detention not only 
raises serious constitutional concerns, but also violates fundamental 
principles of international human rights law.293 Immigration detention 
under human rights law “must be justified as reasonable, necessary and 
 
 289 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600–01 (1999). 
 290 DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 136; Kimberly A. Ehntholt & William Yule, 
Practitioner Review: Assessment and Treatment of Refugee Children and Adolescents Who Have 
Experienced War-Related Trauma, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1197 (2006). 
 291 DHS ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 95, at 31; see also Guy J. Coffey et al., The Meaning 
and Mental Health Consequences of Long-Term Immigration Detention for People Seeking 
Asylum, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2070 (2010). Children are uniquely vulnerable to health and 
developmental issues even if detained only for a brief time. See INT’L DET. COAL., CAPTURED 
CHILDHOOD 50 (2012), http://idcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Captured-
Childhood-FINAL-June-2012.pdf. 
 292 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600–01. 
 293 The principles governing detention stem primarily from the rights to liberty and security. 
See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
5, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) art. 9, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A arts. 3 & 9, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35, Article 9 
(Liberty and Security of Person), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter 
General Comment No. 35]; Charter of Fundamental Freedoms of the European Union, art. 6, 
2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 10; Inter.-Am. Comm’n H.R., American Convention on Human Rights art. 
7 (Nov. 22, 1969); Inter.-Am. Comm’n H.R., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man arts. I & XXV (1948); Org. of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights art. 6, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 (June 27, 1981); Principle 7: The Right to 
Freedom from Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty, YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, http://www.
yogyakartaprinciples. org/principle-7 (last visited June 7, 2017). 
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proportionate in the light of the circumstances and reassessed as it 
extends in time.”294 
Reasonableness requires assessing “any special needs or 
considerations in the individual’s case,” while “proportionality requires 
that a balance be struck between the importance of respecting the rights 
to liberty and security of person and freedom of movement, and the 
public policy objectives of limiting or denying these rights.”295 The 
individualized analysis of proportionality should take into account all 
relevant factors, including the likelihood of absconding, whether the 
person poses a danger to the community, the risk of harm in detention, 
and the availability of appropriate medical and mental health care.296 
Detention rules that apply to broad categories of noncitizens, such as 
mandatory detention policies in the United States, are inconsistent with 
this type of individualized analysis.297 
Referencing the same notion of excessiveness that appears in the 
constitutional provisions discussed above, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Detention Guidelines provide 
that “authorities must not take any action exceeding that which is 
strictly necessary to achieve the pursued purpose in the individual 
case.”298 Critically, consideration of alternatives to detention is part of 
the overall assessment of necessity, reasonableness, and 
proportionality.299 Examining whether less restrictive or coercive 
measures could achieve the same ends in each individual case helps 
ensure that detention is used only as a measure of last resort.300 
The principle of proportionality plays a role not only in deciding 
whether to detain someone, but also in choosing among various 
alternatives to detention.301 “[T]he level and appropriateness of 
placement in the community need to balance the circumstances of the 
individual with any risks to the community.”302 An international human 
rights analysis also recognizes that individual factors may change over 
 
 294 See General Comment No. 35, supra note 293, ¶ 18. 
 295 UNHCR, DETENTION GUIDELINES: GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND 
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND ALTERNATIVES TO 
DETENTION 21 (2012) [hereinafter UNHCR DETENTION GUIDELINES], http://www.un.am/up/
library/Gudelines%20Related%20to%20Detention_eng.pdf. 
 296 General Comment No. 35, supra note 293, ¶ 18. 
 297 UNHCR DETENTION GUIDELINES, supra note 295, at 16 (“Mandatory or automatic 
detention is arbitrary as it is not based on an examination of the necessity of the detention in 
the individual case.”); see also General Comment No. 35, supra note 293, ¶ 18. 
 298 UNHCR DETENTION GUIDELINES, supra note 295, at 21. 
 299 Id. at 21–22. 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. at 15–16, 22. 
 302 Id. at 15. 
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time, requiring decisions about detention and alternatives to be 
reviewed periodically by an independent body.303 
Although international human rights law is not enforceable in U.S. 
courts, it is particularly relevant to the detention of asylum seekers, 
since it informs the international interpretation of the U.N. Convention 
and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which serve as the basis 
for U.S. asylum law. Furthermore, the international human rights 
principles of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality echo the 
constitutional prohibitions against excessiveness, as well as the notion of 
reasonable modifications in disability rights law. These human rights 
principles therefore help provide additional insights into how to 
construe and construct the constitutional and disability rights 
arguments discussed above. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether one views immigration detention through the criminal 
lens of pretrial detention or a civil lens similar to institutional 
commitment, the current approach of detention as default is difficult to 
justify. Noncitizens in removal proceedings have a much harder time 
being released from detention than pretrial defendants due to excessive 
bonds, inadequately developed community-based supervision 
programs, and a general failure to calibrate the deprivation of liberty to 
the risk posed by a particular individual. In this respect, immigration 
detention has much to learn from the criminal justice system. At the 
same time, despite the highly vulnerable populations that end up in 
immigration detention, a disability rights framework requiring the most 
integrated setting appropriate has not been applied to the immigration 
system. Rethinking the use of immigration detention through the lenses 
of due process, equal protection, excessive bail, disability rights, and 
basic human rights principles would save both money and lives. 
Congress can also take several steps to support alternatives to 
immigration detention. First and foremost, Congress should 
appropriate more money to these alternatives, especially community-
based alternatives, and less money to detention. This recommendation 
does not require Congress to appropriate any more money for 
immigration enforcement; rather, money currently being spent on 
detention should be diverted to alternative programs. By amending the 
INA’s “mandatory detention” provisions, giving immigration judges 
authority to review all detention decisions, eliminating a minimum 
 
 303 General Comment No. 35, supra note 293, ¶ 18 
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bond requirement, and eliminating the “bed quota” that results in 
arbitrary detention, Congress could further support the development of 
alternatives. 
Finally, community-based organizations also have a critical role to 
play in supporting alternatives to detention. There is a deficit of 
organizations that provide the types of services people need upon being 
released from detention. Many former detainees struggle to find 
permanent housing, transportation, access to health care, legal counsel, 
and employment. By collaborating with each other and with national 
and international organizations, community-based organizations can 
create strategic alliances, draw attention to the need for more funding 
for this type of work, and share valuable knowledge about working with 
immigrants who have been released from detention. These 
organizations can also play a critical role by sharing this knowledge with 
ICE to inform the design of future alternative-to-detention programs 
that utilize a case management approach. 
